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THE REGULATION OF IN-HOUSE COUNSEL: OPENING THE PANDORA’S 
BOX OF PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE 
 
By Pascale Chapdelaine∗  
 
Abstract 
 
The number of lawyers who practice law in-house has significantly increased over the 
last thirty years in North America. While in this part of the world, in-house counsel are 
regulated in the same manner as outside counsel by their professional bars, the recent 
decision by the European Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd et 
al. v. European Communities, reminds us that other parts of the world treat in-house 
counsel very differently. This paper analyses the justifications for a similar treatment of 
in-house counsel and outside counsel by the legal profession. While a detailed contextual 
analysis of in-house counsel’s functions reveals a likelihood of greater vulnerability in 
their ability to balance them with various ethical and professional duties, it also shows 
that outside counsel face similar ethical dilemmas that may vary in degree or in nature. 
The similar regulation of in-house and outside counsel is consistent with a poor 
articulation by the legal profession of the scope of the duty of professional independence 
from the client. And yet such duty exists. As it can conflict with paramount professional 
obligations, including the duty of loyalty to the client, its scope is controversial. Leaving 
the duty of professional independence from the client largely undefined is harmful to in-
house and also outside counsel, their clients, the legal profession and the public interest. 
In-house counsel are in a privileged position to provide legal services in accordance with 
fundamental values of the legal profession. As such, their contribution needs to be better 
recognized and promoted. Generally, regulatory reform is necessary to nurture in-house 
counsel’s ability to provide legal services as  integral members of the bar, while 
minimizing the risks that the privileged proximity to their clients present. Such reform 
will inevitably benefit outside counsel who face comparable issues. A clearer articulation 
of the meaning and scope of the duty of professional independence from the client, 
together with tangible mechanisms to actualize it, will provide greater support to in-house 
and outside counsel to better understand and integrate their various ethical and 
professional duties within their role. It will also benefit all interested parties.   
                                               
∗
 B.C.L., L.L.B. (Mc Gill) LL.M. (K.U.Leuven) Ph.D. (Candidate) Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, 
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I. Introduction 
 
II. In-house counsel within the legal profession: distinct or familiar? 
A. The in-house counsel as salaried employee of a single corporate client 
B. Cumulating business, quasi-legal and legal roles 
C. “Organic proximity”  
(i) In-house counsel representing one person and one side all the time 
(ii)In-house counsel as an “integral part of the business team”  
(iii)The “ideal” in-house counsel  
(iv)The substitution phenomenon 
D. Remuneration for legal services rendered  
E. In-house counsel’s legal and departmental environment 
III. The Pivotal Significance of the Duty of Professional Independence 
IV. Alleviating ethical dilemmas of (in-house) counsel 
V. Conclusion 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The practice of law in-house is by now well established and is increasingly shaping the 
present and future of the legal profession in Canada and in the U.S.1  The percentage of 
lawyers practicing law in Canada within a corporation (“in house”) or the Government is 
significant.2 Commentators and practitioners predict that it is likely to grow.3 Statistics in 
                                               
1
 In-house counsel have their own professional associations: The Canadian Corporate Counsel Association (CCCA): 
http://www.cancorpcounsel.org/; an illustration of the well established presence of in-house counsel in Canada is the 
recent launch of the Magazine Canadian lawyer In House in December 2007. In the U.S., The Corporate Counsel 
Magazine and the online magazine Corporate counsel.com : http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/index.jsp  are addressing issues 
that are specific to in-house counsel. G. C. Hazard, Jr., Ethical Dilemmas of Corporate Counsel (1997) 46 Emory L.J. 
1011, at 1012. Professor Hazard outlines the forces at play that explain the phenomenon of the in-house counsel to 
include: (i) the increased need of corporations for continuous legal assistance (ii) the specialization trend in the legal 
profession (iii) the work environment of the large law firm comparing equally or less favorably to the environment of 
in-house legal departments (iv) the strategic position of in-house counsel and power in selecting when and which 
outside counsel to be retained and (v) the “affirmative self-assurance of corporate counsel”. 
2
 In Ontario, as of December 31, 2009, the percentage of registered lawyers employed as “Corporate Counsel” was 5%, 
“other” i.e. including the “corporate and non-profit sector” was 13 %  and 15 % in “Government” for a total of 33 % of 
registered lawyers:  “Law Society of Upper Canada 2009 Annual Report Performance Highlights”, at 6: available 
online at the Law Society of Upper Canada website at http://www.lsuc.on.ca/with.aspx?id=1132   (last visited on 
February 6, 2011). Those statistics do not give a further break down of how many of those registered lawyers actually 
perform the function of counsel. In Québec, as of March 31 2010, 54 % of registered lawyers were in private practice 
and 46%  were in the category “other”: Rapport Annuel 2009-2010, Barreau du Québec, at 23, available online at the 
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the U.S. show similar trends.4 Historical accounts of the legal profession point to ups and 
downs in the importance, power and prestige of in-house counsel since the late nineteenth 
century, with a “renaissance” of in-house counsel since the mid-seventies onwards.5  
Among others, the influence of the growth in number and power of in-house counsel,  
manifests itself by how it shapes the practice of law of outside counsel representing 
corporations. 6  
 
                                                                                                                                            
website of Le Barreau du Québec www.barreau.qc.ca/pdf/publications/rapports-annuels/2009-2010.pdf.   The 2008-
2009 Annual Report provides more detailed information. As of March 31, 2009, 16% of registered lawyers were 
employed in a legal department ( 9 %  in the private sector and 7 %  in the public or semi-public sector) 5% were 
employed as managers or executives,  19 % were employed by the Government or a municipality (5 % at the federal 
level, 11% at the provincial level and 3% at the municipal level; these numbers do not include other public or semi-
public functions such as being member of a board or commission, legal aid, attorney general office or municipal courts) 
for a total of up to 35% to 40% of registered lawyers potentially performing the functions of in-house counsel: Rapport 
Annuel 2008-2009, Barreau du Québec, at 19 and 38, available online at the website of Le Barreau du Québec: 
http://www.barreau.qc.ca/pdf/publications/rapports-annuels/2008-2009.pdf (last visited February 6, 2011).  
3On earlier statistics on in house counsel and a discussion on the trend towards a  growing number of in house counsel, 
see: B. G. Smith, Professional Conduct For Lawyers and Judges, (Fredericton: Maritime Law Book, 1998) Chapter 10, 
pp 2 and fol.; see the comments by several in-house counsel on the calculations made by their corporations that favor 
hiring more in-house counsel rather than outsourcing legal services to law firms on a cost-benefit analysis : J. 
Landry,“Table Ronde, Faire carrière au contentieux”, Le Journal, Barreau du Québec 40:3 (March 2008) 21 at 40.  
 
4
 For a U.S. perspective on the growing importance of “in-house” or “corporate counsel” in the legal profession, see R. 
E. Rosen, “The Inside Counsel Movement, Professional Judgment and Organizational Representation”, (1989) 64 Ind. 
L.J. 479 ; M. C. Daly, “The Role of General Counsel Perspective, The Cultural, Ethical and Legal Challenges in 
Lawyering for a Global Organization” (1997) 46 Emory L.J. 1057; for statistics on  in-house counsel in the U.S. see: 
S.L. Schwarcz, “To Make or to Buy: In-House Lawyering and Value Creation” (2008) 33 J. Corp. L. 497, in particular 
at footnote 2;  as of  April 2011, the Association of Corporate Counsel (formerly the American Corporate Counsel 
Association) had over 26,000 members in 75 countries worldwide (including a Canadian Chapter): 
http://www.acc.com/   (last visited in April 2011).  
  
5
 C. D. Liggio, “The Changing Role of Corporate Counsel” (1997) 46 Emory L.J. 1201, at 1201-1207, refers to three 
distinct periods of the in-house counsel status and role within the American legal profession since the twenties. The 
1920s and 1930s were a period of “glory” for in-house counsel: their advice was highly sought by management and 
their position in their corporation ranked comparably to the most senior ranks in their client corporation. The forties 
until the mid seventies saw a decline in the role and prestige of the corporate counsel. Liggio attributes it to the 
emergence of business school training and to the fact that their graduates were the newly highly sought after senior 
executives. Finally, he characterizes the mid-seventies onwards as the “renaissance” of the corporate counsel. Liggio 
attributes it to four factors: (i) an increasingly litigious society (ii) the greater legal complexity of doing business (iii) 
the exponential growth of outside counsel fees and (iv) the application of business principles and techniques to legal 
services, as well as being more critical of and outspoken about the legal profession. See also Daly, supra note 4, at 1059 
and fol.; S. M. Kim “Dual identities and dueling obligations: preserving independence in corporate 
representation”(2001) 68 tenn. l. rev. 179, at 199 and fol.; D. A. DeMott ,“The discrete roles of general counsel”(2005) 
74 Fordham L. Rev. 955, at 957 & fol. ; S. H. Duggin, “The Pivotal Role of the General Counsel in Promoting 
Corporate Integrity and Professional Responsibility” (2007) 51 St. Louis U. L.J. 989, at 995-1001. 
 
 
6
 The correlation between the increased influence and prestige of the in-house counsel and the nature of the legal 
practice of outside counsel was already noted more than twenty years ago by A. Chayes & A. H. Chayes, “Corporate 
Counsel and the Elite Law Firm” (1985) 37 Stan. L. Rev. 277, at 293-299; see also R.L. Nelson and L.B. Nielson, 
“Cops, Counsel, and Entrepreneurs: Constructing the Role of Inside Counsel in Large Corporations” (2000) 34 Law & 
Soc'y Rev., 457, at 457-458. 
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In-house counsel in Canada and in the U.S., are regulated in the same manner as outside 
counsel by the Codes of professional conduct of provincial (or state) bars and law 
societies.7 At least two professional bars address the practice of law in-house more 
specifically.8 Le Barreau du Québec, for example, issued a report in 2008 on in-house 
counsel, in which it discusses in detail their unique position and its implications for the 
rules of professional conduct.9 
 
There is a growing body of academic literature on the ethical issues of in-house counsel 
in the U.S.10 This trend has been amplified in recent years in the aftermath of corporate 
scandals that involved in-house counsel: WorldCom, Tyco, Rite Aid, Hewlett Packard 
and Enron.11 The adoption by U.S. Congress of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 12 in an 
                                               
7
 Hereafter referred to generally as “Codes of Professional Conduct”. See: The Canadian Bar Association Code of 
Professional Conduct 2009 (hereafter the “CBA Code”), Canadian Bar Association, available online at 
http://www.cba.org/CBA/activities/code/ , xiv: specifies that the CBA Code applies to lawyers indiscriminately of the 
nature of their practice (i.e. whether private practice, employee of a corporation or the Government); the Law Society 
of Upper Canada, Rules of Professional Conduct, Adopted by Convocation June 2000, as amended) , (hereafter the 
“L.S.U.C. Rules” ), available online at Law Society of Upper 
Canada website at http://www.lsuc.on.ca/regulation/a/profconduct/; Rule 1, 1.02 “Definitions”, “lawyer”;  
Code of ethics of advocates, c. B-1, r.1, (hereafter the “Québec Code of  Ethics”) available online at the website of  
Barreau du Québec 
http://www2.publicationsduquebec.gouv.qc.ca/dynamicSearch/telecharge.php?type=2&file=%2F%2FB_1%2FB1R1_A
.htm , 1.00.01;   the Law Society of Alberta Code of Professional Conduct, February 2007, (hereafter the “L.S.A. 
Code”), online: Law Society of Alberta 
http://www.lawsocietyalberta.com/resources/rulesOfTheLawSociety_Y2RgvP.cfm , section “Interpretation” , 4. 
“Definitions in this Code”, (n) “lawyer”. 
 
8
 Barreau du Québec,  Guide 2008 de déontologie appliquée aux avocats en entreprise, available online on the website 
of Le Barreau du Québec http://www.barreau.qc.ca/publications/avocats/index.html; the L.S.A.  Code, supra note 8, 
Chapter 12, The Lawyer in Corporate and in Government Service; other codes include occasional references to in-
house counsel for illustrative purposes or to emphasize the application of a rule of conduct to the in-house counsel: the 
CBA Code, supra note 7, Chapter V Impartiality and Conflict of interest between clients, commentary 32 B: the 
L.S.U.C. Rules, supra note 7, 2.02(1.1), 2.02 (5.1) and (5.2), commentary to 2.03(3) and 2.05 (3).  
 
9
 Barreau du Québec,  Guide 2008 de déontologie appliquée aux avocats en entreprise, supra note 8: the Guide frames 
the unique position of the in house counsel as follows: (i) the in-house has one single client, which is his employer, (ii) 
the in-house counsel must ensure compliance with his duty of confidentiality towards his client and (iii) the in-house 
counsel must maintain his loyalty towards his client-employer while preserving his independence and avoid conflict of 
interests.  
 
10
 For instance, one symposium was entirely devoted to in–house counsel in 1997: “The Randolph W. Thrower 
Symposium, The Role of General Counsel Perspective” (reported in (1997) 46 Emory L.J.); another symposium 
focused on ethics in corporate representation: “Colloquium Ethics in Corporate Representation” (reported in (2005)74 
Fordham L. Rev.). 
 
11
 For a review of the ethical issues of lawyers involved in these corporate scandals, see S. H. Kim, “The Banality of 
Fraud: Re-situating the Inside Counsel as Gatekeeper” (2005)74 Fordham L. Rev. 983; Regarding the Hewlett Packard 
spying scandal, see S. Reisinger, “Saw No Evil” (2007) Corporate Counsel, January at 68. 
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attempt to address securities fraud, as well as the counsel-corporate client relationship, is 
also worth mentioning to explain this trend. For its part, the Canadian academic literature 
on the ethical issues in-house counsel is scarce. 13  
 
While the regulatory regimes of Canadian provinces and American states all embrace an 
“egalitarian” approach towards in-house and outside counsel, the European scene is much 
more diverse. The regulation of in-house counsel  varies significantly from one country to 
the other.  At one end of the spectrum, there are jurisdictions where in-house counsel are 
not allowed to be members of the bar while being employees of their client-corporation. 
At the other end of the spectrum, in-house counsel are regulated by their bar in the same 
manner as outside counsel. In between, in-house counsel are allowed to be members of 
the bar, subject to entering into a special agreement that imposes specific requirements 
regarding their employment to safeguard their independence.14 The highest court in 
Europe recently reinforced the trend towards a different treatment of in-house counsel in 
the legal profession. In Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd et al. v. European Communities,15 the 
                                                                                                                                            
12
 Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 307, 116 Stat. 745, 784 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (Supp. II 2002)) hereafter 
the “Sarbanes-Oxley Act” or “SOX”; SEC Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 17 
C.F.R. § 205.4 (2003) (Responsibilities of supervisory attorneys); 17 C.F.R. § 205.5 (2003) (Responsibilities of a 
subordinate attorney). 
 
13
 The recent Canadian academic works dealing specifically with ethical issues of in-house counsel include: Paul D. 
Paton, “Corporate Counsel as Corporate Conscience: Ethics and Integrity in the Post-Enron Era” (2006) 84 Can. Bar 
Rev. 533; Smith, supra note 3, devotes Chapter 10 of her book to “The Lawyer as in-house counsel”; for an empirical 
study of the ethical decision making of in-house counsel, based on a survey conducted with the Canadian Association 
of Corporate Counsel, see: H. P.Gunz and S. P. Gunz, “The Lawyer’s Response to Organizational Professional 
Conflict: an Empirical Study of the Ethical Decision Making of In-House Counsel” (2002) 39 ABLJ 241; for an 
analysis of ethical issues of Government counsel, see:  D. MacNair, “In the Service of the Crown: are Ethical 
Obligations Different for Government Counsel?” (2006) 84 CBR 501; A.C. Hutchison, “‘In the Public Interest’: The 
Responsibilities and Rights of Government Lawyers”  (2008) 46 Osgoode Hall L.J. 105; for an account on the paucity 
of Canadian academic work on legal ethics generally, see: A. M. Dodek, “Canadian Legal Ethics, a Subject in Search 
of Scholarship”, (2000) 50 University of Toronto Law Journal 115; see also A.M. Dodek, “Canadian Legal Ethics: 
Ready for the Twenty-First Century at Last” (2008) 46 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1 in particular at 44, where the author 
points to important gaps in Canadian legal ethics literature, including the particular case of in-house 
counsel.  
 
14
 For a discussion on the various regulations of in-house counsel in European countries see Joined Cases T-125/03 and 
T-253/03 Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd et al. v. Commission of the European Communities, 2007, paragraphs 149 to 171, 
Court of First Instance European Communities (herafter the “Akzo Nobel case, first instance”). See also the Opinion of 
Advocate General Kokott, delivered on 29 April 2010, Case C-550/07 P, Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd and Akcros 
Chemicals Ltd v European Commission,  at paragraphs 89 and 101.  
   
 
 
15
 Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd et al. v. Commission of the European Communities, 2010, C-550/07 P, The Grand 
Chamber of the European Communities, available online at  http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin . 
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Court, Grand Chamber confirmed the judgment by the Court of First Instance,16 to the 
effect that in-house counsel lacked the necessary professional independence from their 
client by virtue of their employment link to their employer corporation.17 Hence it was 
held that the ‘legal professional privilege’ (or ‘LPP’) 18  did not apply to the 
communications between an in-house counsel and the other members of his employer 
corporation. The case involved the judicial review of various decisions by the European 
Commission based on the Commission’s powers of investigation on competition matters, 
and in particular, on the Commission’s refusal to apply the LPP to certain documents that 
were seized in the course of its investigation.  
 
The differential treatment of in-house counsel in Europe may come as a surprise to many 
North-American lawyers. This begs the question whether the legal profession in Canada 
and also in the U.S., has overlooked the different status and position of in-house counsel 
by assimilating them to outside counsel for regulatory purposes.19  Why has the well 
established presence of in-house counsel, in number and power, been receiving so little 
attention in the Canadian academic literature? Are in-house counsel more likely than 
outside counsel to encounter ethical dilemmas that deserve greater attention and support 
from the legal profession?20 What does this uncontroversial equal treatment between in-
house and outside counsel reveal about the legal profession?  
                                               
16
 Supra note 14.   
17
 Akzo Nobel case first instance, supra note 14, par. 166 to 174.   
 
18
 The “Legal professional privilege’ or ‘LPP’ refers to the protection of confidentiality of communications between 
lawyers and their clients for which the following conditions must be present: (i) such communications are made for the 
purposes of the exercise of the client’s rights of defense and (ii) they emanate from independent lawyers: the Akzo 
Nobel case, supra note 14, at par. 117. 
 
19
 One possible explanation advanced is the desire and persuasiveness of in-house counsel not to be treated differently 
than their outside counsel colleagues, for fear to be relinquished to a “second-class status” with the loss of prestige and 
recognition from the profession that would ensue: S.R. Weaver, “Ethical Dilemmas of Corporate Counsel: a Structural 
and Contextual Analysis” (1997) 46 Emory L.J. 1023, at 1031. 
 
20
 For a recent  Canadian empirical study on ethical dilemmas encountered by in house counsels, see Gunz and Gunz, 
supra note 13 at 252- 263 and at 279. The authors performed an empirical study that comprised the analysis of 484 
questionnaires filled out by in-house counsel throughout Canada. The participants displayed low levels of 
“Organizational Professional Conflict”. The authors explain these results by categorizing the respondents into three 
distinct categories: “Lawyer”, “Technician” and “Observer”, and that not perceiving an existing organizational 
professional conflict may be attributable to how in-house counsel views her role. On whether in-house counsel are 
more likely than outside counsel to disciplinary actions, see Paton, supra note 13, at 544: the research performed by the 
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The main purpose of this article is to question the premises underlying the similar 
treatment approach of the legal profession between in-house counsel and outside counsel. 
In Part II, I discuss important characteristics of in-house counsel’s practice of law and 
how they may raise ethical issues. I compare their situation with the reality of outside 
counsel to assess the legal profession’s approach to treat inside and outside counsel alike.  
While I point to some differences between in-house and outside counsel that may place 
in-house counsel in a more vulnerable position, they are more likely to be variations in 
degree rather than substantial differences. The privileged position of in-house counsel 
places them at an advantage to provide legal services in accordance with the chore values 
of the legal profession. This contribution needs to be better recognized and the proper 
support needs to be in place to promote it even further. In Part III, I look at the current 
regulation of the legal profession and whether sufficient support is provided to in-house 
counsel and outside counsel. I take a closer look at the duty of professional independence 
as the pivotal point to understand the uniform approach taken by the legal profession to 
regulate in-house counsel and outside counsel. The duty of professional independence 
from the client is poorly articulated in our Codes of Professional Conduct. It is 
overshadowed by other duties that are all geared towards ensuring an undivided and 
devout service toward the client. The uniform regulation of in-house and outside counsel 
is consistent with a timid articulation of the duty of professional independence from the 
client as well as of the ideal counsel. Yet the duty of professional independence from the 
client exists and for that reason, it needs to be articulated better, for the benefit of 
counsel, their clients, the legal profession and the public. I also seek to explain the lack of 
consensus and representation by the legal profession of the “ideal counsel”. In Part IV, I 
look at ways by which the legal profession can provide better support to in-house and 
outside counsel through regulation. In addition to articulating more clearly the duty of 
professional independence from the client and of the ideal counsel, I explore how Codes 
of Professional Conduct, as binding instruments for members of the legal profession, can 
                                                                                                                                            
author in the reported professional conduct cases of the Law Society of Upper Canada did not indicate a larger number 
of disciplinary actions involving in house counsel than outside counsel. 
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be used effectively to ensure that important structural aspects of the practice of law are 
aligned to counsel professional duties.   
 
The analysis presented in this article is based on a review of Codes of Professional 
Conduct,21  recent Canadian and U.S. academic literature on in-house counsel, including 
accounts of empirical research on in-house counsel, Canadian lawyer magazines,22 as 
well as similar U.S. magazines. It is also based on my personal experience as outside 
counsel and in-house counsel for over fourteen years. The greater emphasis of this paper 
is on corporate, commercial in-house counsel in the private sector, but some of the 
remarks may apply to counsel in the public sector (especially counsel working for public 
corporations), as salaried employee to a single client, recognizing that Government 
functions within the public sector bring another set of distinct issues that call for different 
considerations.23 The main reason for the focus on corporate, commercial in-house 
counsel is that transactional counsel are by essence not confronted with the institutional 
scrutiny that results from the involvement of the judiciary and the more immediate and 
visible need to balance between the client interests and duties towards the courts, 
opposing parties and their counsel.24 The transactional practice of law may therefore 
expose counsel to greater ethical dilemmas and require more ethical vigilance and 
awareness. 
                                               
21
 Reference to the “Codes of Professional Conduct” in this paper refer generally to the body of legal profession codes 
of ethics and conduct in Canada. References are made to The CBA Code, supra note 7. While Canadian lawyers are 
regulated by independent Provincial Bars or Law Societies, the CBA Code has been adopted by some Provincial Bars 
and Law Societies, with modifications. It is used as a point of reference to define Canadian standards of conduct in the 
legal profession: see “About the CBA Code of Professional Conduct”, available online at the Canadian Bar Association 
website at http://www.cba.org/CBA/activities/code/  (last visited, February 6, 2011). References are also made to 
specific Provincial Rules of Professional Conduct, in particular to the L.S.U.C. Rules, supra note 7, the Québec Code of 
Ethics, supra note 7, the L.S.A. Code, supra note 7, and The Law Society of British Columbia Professional Conduct 
Handbook, last revised in November 2010, (hereafter the “LSBC Rules”), available online at the  Law Society of 
British Columbia website at: http://www.lawsociety.bc.ca/publications_forms/handbook/handbook_toc.html . 
 
22
 “Canadian Lawyer In-House” available online at the Canadian Lawyer website at: 
ttp://www.canadianlawyermag.com/INHOUSE-Digital-Edition.html, (December 2007-December 2008)  ; “Le Journal, 
Barreau du Québec”, available at Le Barreau du Québec website at : www.barreau.qc.ca/journal (2003-2008), “Ontario 
Lawyers Gazette” available online at the Law Society of Upper Canada website at 
http://www.lsuc.on.ca/news/b/olg/(2005-2008), “National Magazine”, available at the Canadian Bar Association 
website at: http://www.cba.org/CBA/National/Main/ (2003-2008).  
 
23
 For a discussion on the ethical issues of Government counsel see MacNair, supra note 13.  
24
 C. Parker & A. Evans, Inside Lawyers’ Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007)  at 214, argue that 
corporate lawyers ethics (including outside counsel) may be more important than any other sector of the profession, 
given that corporate lawyers are involved in almost every economic activity of our society. 
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II. In-house counsel within the legal profession: distinct or familiar? 
 
What is specific to in-house counsel’s practice of law25 and how does it contrast with or 
corroborate our ideals of the legal profession, as expressed in the Codes of Professional 
Conduct? Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. has characterized the role of the in-house counsel as 
one of the most complex in the legal profession.26 In his work on the in-house counsel 
movement in the U.S., Robert Eli Rosen discerned for his part three common 
characteristics to describe the work and functions of the in-house counsel at the largest 
corporations: (1) in-house counsel perform the same work as outside counsel in all areas 
of practice; (2) in house counsel have a management function vis-à-vis the outside 
counsel, acting as “corporate agents” for legal services on behalf of their corporation; and 
(3) legal prevention functions. 27 An empirical study by Robert L. Nelson and  Laura 
Beth Nielson on how corporate counsel approach their work suggests that they navigate 
between three distinct roles: “cops” i.e. “limiting their advice to legal mandates”, 
“counsel”, i.e. “combining legal and business advice”, or “entrepreneurs”, i.e. “giving 
priority to business objectives rather than legal analysis.”28  Another empirical study 
based on interviews with Ontario lawyers, that was conducted by Margaret Ann 
Wilkinson, Christa Walker and Peter Mercer, revealed that in-house counsel were 
significantly more concerned about issues of role than outside counsel.29  In-house 
counsel also exhibited higher on-going stress levels after a conflict with their client 
                                               
25
 For a description of the functions performed by in-house counsel in the U.S. see, Daly, supra note, 5 at 1068-189; 
Kim, supra note 5, at 201-202; Kim, supra note 11, at 1001-1033. 
26
 Hazard, supra note 1, at 1011. 
27
 Rosen, supra note 4, at 504. 
 
28
 R.L. Nelson and L.B. Nielson, supra note 6 at 457, 460-461 & 468: the authors focused their research on interviews 
with 54 individuals, 42 of whom are corporate counsel and 12 of whom are non-lawyer managers in a large financial 
corporation, from three large U.S. urban areas. Their analysis revealed that about 17% were associated with the role of 
the “cop”, 33% met the definition of the “entrepreneur” and 50% fell into the category of “counsel”. 
 
29
 M.A.Wilkinson, C.Walker and P.Mercer, “Testing Theory and Debunking Stereotypes: Lawyers' Views on the 
Practice of Law” (2005)18 Can. J.L. & Juris. 165, at 183: the study involved the analysis of interviews conducted with 
154 lawyers in large, medium-sized and smaller firms at four different –sized centers in Ontario. 
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representative had occurred, than their outside counsel colleagues.30 The authors 
concluded from their study that in-house counsel constitute a distinct group within the 
legal profession.31   
 
I present here in-house counsel’s functions through five distinctive aspects: (i) in-house 
counsel as salaried employees of a single corporate client (ii) the combination of legal, 
quasi legal and non legal roles (iii) the “organic proximity” of in-house counsel (iv) the 
impact of the remuneration method for rendering legal services from the perspective of 
recipients of such services and (v) the legal department environment of in-house counsel. 
 
A. In-house counsel as salaried employees of a single corporate client 
 
In Alfred Crompton Amusement Machines Ltd. v. Commissioners of Customs and Excises 
(No.2), Lord Denning characterized the position of the in-house counsel as being no 
different from the one of the outside counsel: “Many barristers and solicitors are 
employed as legal advisers, whole time, by a single employer. Sometimes the employer is 
a great commercial concern. At other times it is a government department or a local 
authority. …In every case these legal advisers do legal work for their employer and for 
no one else. They are paid, not by fees for each piece of work, but by a fixed annual 
salary. They are, no doubt, servants or agents of the employer. … They are regarded by 
the law as in every respect in the same position as those who practice on their own 
account. The only difference is that they act for one client only, and not for several 
clients. They must uphold the same standards of honor and of etiquette. They are subject 
to the same duties to their client and to the court.”32 Yet, the employment situation of in-
house counsel to a single corporate client is the most frequently invoked factor to 
                                               
30
 Ibid, at 183. 
 
31
 Ibid, at 186.  
 
32
 [1972] 2 All.E.R. 373 (C.A.), at 376. In that case, one of the issues was to determine whether the legal professional 
privilege applied to communications between legal advisers and their employer (who is also their client). The Court of 
Appeal found that it did apply.  
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distinguish in-house counsel from outside counsel.33 The concern is that this total 
financial dependence of in-house counsel to their single client-corporation may 
compromise their professional independence34 and place them in a situation of personal 
conflict of interest.35 In order to properly assess the validity of this concern, one first 
needs to clarify the meaning of “professional independence.”36 When analyzing the 
potential  impact of  in-house counsel’s reliance on a single source of revenue on their 
ability to retain their independent professional judgment, we generally refer to the type of 
professional independence that a lawyer needs to maintain from external influences (to 
the client) to unequivocally and loyally serve their clients’ interests. Such external 
influences are addressed among others by the various conflicts of interest rules in the 
Codes of Professional Conduct.37 The in-house counsel client is the corporation, not its 
representatives.38 A situation of personal conflict of interest can thus arise when the 
corporation representatives, on which in-house counsel’s performance evaluation and 
remuneration depend, have expectations and exert pressures on in-house counsel’s role 
that conflict with their duty to serve the best interests of the corporation.39 Performance 
                                               
33
 S.R. Weaver, supra note 19,  at 1027;  Hazard, supra note 1, at 1015-1016;  DeMott, supra note 5, at 967-968; Kim, 
supra note 5, at 257; Paton supra note 13 at 538; Duggin supra note 7, at 1035; E. Norman Veasey, Christine T. Di 
Guglielmo, “The Tensions, Stresses, and Professional Responsibilities of the Lawyer for the Corporation” (2006) 62 
Bus. Law. 1, at 11-12. 
 
34
 DeMott, supra note 5, at 967-968, Paton supra note 13, at 538; Veasy and Di Guglielmo, supra note 33, at 11-12: 
although Veasy and Di Guglielmo acknowledge the risk that the independent professional judgment of the employed 
in-house counsel may be at risk, they also note that: “…the employment relationship may also enhance an in-house 
lawyer's job security as compared with that of outside counsel, giving the in-house lawyer a greater opportunity to 
influence positively the company's legal policies.”  
 
35
 Kim, supra note 5, at 207-208. One way to approach this potential personal conflict of interest arising from the fact 
that the in-house counsel is the employee of his client-corporation is the fact that this conflict is fully disclosed to the 
client-employer and that by the employment of the in-house counsel the client has waived his rights under the conflict 
of interest rules either explicitly or implicitly. However, if we take a broader view of professional independence from 
the client as an obligation that is owed to the state and the public, and not the client, then it could not be the subject of a 
waiver: see Kim, supra note 5, at 250.   
 
36
 The various meanings of professional independence are discussed in Part III of this paper “The Pivotal Significance 
of the Duty of Professional Independence”. 
 
37
 This type of professional independence is referred to as “Three-Party independence”: see discussion below in Part III 
of this paper.  
 
38
 L.S.U.C. Rules, supra note 7, 2.02 (1.1); for a discussion on the conceptual and practical difficulties posed by this 
principle, see, A. C. Hutchison, “Who’s the Client and Why it Matters?” (2006) 84 CBR 411, at 425. 
 
39
 Kim, supra note 11, at 1053 and fol.: the author proposes structural solutions to address this misalignment. On the 
function that a gatekeeping approach to the practice law of in-house can have on reinforcing the alignment of in-house 
counsel’s duty to represent the corporation (and not its representatives) see: S.H. Kim, “Lawyer Exceptionalism in The 
Gatekeeping Wars” (2010) 63 SMU L. Rev. 73. 
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objectives and remuneration incentives that are pre-defined by the client-employer-
corporation can also have important effects on the ethical behavior of in-house counsel. It 
is a common practice for in-house legal department performance objectives to be aligned 
with the ones of the corporation.40  Ethical issues may arise when those performance 
incentives and objectives are misaligned with in-house counsel’s ethical duties to retain 
independent professional judgment and to preserve the client corporation’s best legal 
interests.41   
 
Similar misalignments between the best interests of the client-corporation and financial 
pressures of counsel also exist in an outside counsel environment.42 From that perspective 
alone, in-house counsel may be in an even better position than outside counsel to provide 
legal advice that is unencumbered by financial considerations of billable hours, status and 
prestige of retaining a client in the firm.43 Many commentators suggest that in today’s 
highly competitive environment for legal services, the financial pressures experienced by 
outside counsel may be different than the ones of in-house counsel, but they are no less 
significant. 44 Yet, the “all or nothing” position that in-house counsel are facing should 
not be underestimated.45  Outside counsel may rightly fear that their position could be 
seriously weakened if they lose a major client, but they can still act for others. In-house 
                                                                                                                                            
 
 
 
40
 See the comments by Monique Mercier, Vice-President of legal affairs at Emergis, stating that it is  essential for the 
objectives of the law department to be aligned with the ones of the corporation and of the CEO: L. Vadnais, 
“Maximiser le rôle de l’avocat en entreprise, passer avantageusement de conseiller juridique à conseiller stratégique” 
Le Journal, Barreau du Québec 38:6 (June2006) at 20. 
 
41
 See the discussion in Part IV of this paper. 
42
 R. W. Gordon, “The independence of lawyers” (1988) 68 B.U. L. Rev. 1, at 34; Duggin, supra note 5, at 1035; Kim, 
supra note 5, at 204: the author notes similarities with the law firm environment and high competition around legal 
services; J. Landry, “Les avocats en enterprise Un Code d’éthique efficace s’inscrit dans la culture d’entreprise” Le 
Journal, Barreau du Québec 40:2 (February 2008), 8: where some of the in-house counsel interviewed on ethical issues 
of in-house counsel, point out that the greatest pressures they felt about compromising their professional judgment to 
deliver a legal opinion that would please the client were in private practice, because the economic stakes (i.e. 
potentially loosing a big client) were so high, and that in comparison, they never experienced such pressure as in-house 
counsel. 
 
43
 See the discussion in this Part II, D below “Remuneration for legal services rendered”. 
 
44
 Supra note 40. 
 
45
 Kim, supra note 5, at 204. 
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counsel have no other clients to fall back on. At the same time, some in-house counsel 
argue that they are better protected than outside counsel are on the possible retaliatory 
measures of their client, given that the dismissal of an employee counsel is a more drastic 
step than quietly selecting a new outside counsel.46 Ultimately, the impact of the single 
source of revenue ties of in-house counsel to their client corporation may not so much be 
how likely it is that the corporation’s representatives will actually dismiss or otherwise 
“punish”47 in-house counsel for not taking an agreeable position to their own interests. 
Rather, the proper question is: how likely is it that in-house counsel will be more 
influenced in their professional judgment by the perceived threat of such retaliation 
(whether real or not) than outside counsel? While the “single source of revenue” factor is 
a critical issue to consider when looking at the likely behavior of in-house counsel, 
outside counsel are not immune from similar considerations. Also, the potential effects of  
“single source of revenue” need to be assessed in combination with other aspects of in-
house counsel’s environment: some factors may add to the pressures and create personal 
conflicts of interests, while some others may place in-house counsel in a more enviable 
position to serve the interests of both their client and the legal profession. 
 
B. Cumulating business, quasi-legal and legal roles 
 
In-house counsel often cumulate roles and responsibilities that entail distinct business and 
legal functions.48 Commentators have pointed to increased ethical dilemmas created by a 
                                               
46
 See J. Landry, supra note 42, in which one of the interviewed in-house counsel points out that a client can more 
easily change law firms than fire a lawyer who gives a legal opinion that the client is discontent with. He adds that 
refusing to give an opinion that will please the client is no just cause of termination and that the in-house counsel is 
better protected in that regard; See J. Landry, “Table ronde, Les avocats en enterprise, porte-étendard de la rectitude” 
Le Journal, Barreau du Québec 40:1 (Janvier 2008) 11, at 12: the comments of Me Depelteau on the fact that there is 
support and even respect in a corporate environment when an in-house counsel says that he wants to withdraw from a 
case. 
 
47
 See Hazard, supra note 1, at 1015-1016, where the author adds the risk of being “professionally blacklisted”.  
  
48
 It is not uncommon to see in-house counsel cumulating human resource, ethics or privacy compliance management 
functions with legal roles. See L. Vadnais, supra note 40, at 20. For a discussion on the determinant motivator of 
cumulating various functions, attracting lawyers towards in-house counsel positions, see Daly, supra note 4, at 1072. 
DeMott, supra, note 5, at 965 and fol. describes four roles generally cumulated by general counsel: (1) legal adviser to 
the corporation and its constituents (2) corporate officer and member of senior management team (3) administrator of 
the internal legal department and (4) agent of the corporation in dealings with third parties; see Veasey and Di 
Guglielmo, supra note 33, at 25. 
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juxtaposition of these roles by in-house counsel.49 A typical example of a corporate 
practice that may raise ethical issues is having the corporation’s legal counsel (whether 
in-house or outside counsel) sit on its board of directors, therefore cumulating potentially 
conflicting roles.50 Another example, at a more day-to-day level, could involve an in–
house counsel who is also fulfilling a management role in another department, such as the 
human resources department. Hypothetically, she could be asked to implement a 
company policy that is to grant less than the legal requirements for severance pay upon 
the termination of employment of its employees, as a calculated effort to reduce the 
company’s costs in this area. As a human resources manager, she is rewarded and 
evaluated on the number of employee terminations that she handles per year at the lowest 
cost. As a lawyer, she knows that the severance offers are below the minimum legal 
requirements. In such instances, the in-house counsel /human resources manager may be 
in conflict with her ethical obligations, depending on how we define the proper role of 
counsel. 51 If in-house counsel are asked to simultaneously perform business activities as 
well as legal services and are incented and rewarded on both (for example, with business 
performance targets), then the lawyer-client relationship becomes at best blurry.52 
Although there can be a great synergy by this knowledge and expertise being combined, 
one can think of many instances where the competent legal advice that ought to be given 
in the best interest of the client-employer and the business objectives may diverge. This 
places counsel in an ambivalent position that is less than desirable from an ethical 
perspective.53 This has lead some commentators to take the position that in-house counsel 
should refrain altogether from cumulating formal roles other than the one of legal advisor 
to the Corporation and be very cautious in taking on any non-legal functions.54 Although 
                                               
49
 DeMott, supra, note 5, at 965 and fol.; Guglielmo, supra note 33, at 25. 
 
50
   Kim, supra note 5,  at 247 & fol.; see also Veasey and  Di Guglielmo, supra note 33, at 15 & fol.; Duggin, supra 
note 5, at 1016 & fol.; C. C. Albert, “The Lawyer-Director: An Oxymoron?” (1996) 9 Geo. J of Legal Ethics 413. 
   
51
 I.e. whether she is a hired gun serving the immediate identified need of the client or a legal adviser with the duty to 
uphold and promote the application of the law. The various conceptions of the proper roles of counsel vary 
significantly depending on whether we see this role as based on the liberal advocacy ideal or the ideal of law as a public 
profession: see Gordon, supra note 42, at 10-11. 
 
52
 See the discussion in this Part II, C (iv) below: “The substitution phenomenon”. 
 
53
  Weaver, supra note 19, at 1039 argues the more role counsel will cumulate, the more he is at risk to be in situations 
of conflict of interest. 
54
 Ibid, at 1039-1040. 
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this may appear as the sounder and safer approach to take, the pressure that in-house 
counsel may feel from the corporate culture to take on additional roles should not be 
underestimated. Refusing such advancement opportunities may be negatively perceived 
by senior management as a lack of flexibility to respond to the demands of the 
organization or a risk adverse mentality that runs counter to corporations’ expectations 
with respect to their employees.  
 
One could argue that the combination of roles by in-house counsel and the potential 
conflict of interests that can arise from it can be resolved by way of an implicit or explicit 
waiver or similar mechanisms by the employer-client. This would constitute the 
recognition of ongoing potential conflicts and would be similar to the specific waivers 
that clients sign when counsel disclose a situation of conflict of interest that may impair 
their ability to serve the interests of the client without any obstruction. Although it may 
work conceptually in some cases, in others, the conflict is irreconcilable. Take for 
example the in-house counsel /human resources representative. What is there to be 
waived? How is counsel to know which course of action to take to fulfill her management 
role while respecting her duties to her client-employer and to the legal profession? How 
could the corporation-client agree in advance to a blanket waiver in a truly informed 
manner, without being able to fully understand all potential detrimental effects to the 
client-employer of such waiver? Also, putting into the client-employer’s hands the ability 
to waive potential conflicts of interest of counsel, that may be detrimental to the client-
employer and other affected parties, is only acceptable legally and ethically, if counsel 
does not owe a greater overarching duty to the legal profession and to the public to 
maintain a greater distance from the client, which on that basis could not be waived.55    
  
 From a professional conduct perspective, lawyers have a duty to advise their client of 
any portion of their advice that is not legal advice.56 This rule flows from the general duty 
                                               
55
 See E. W. Myers, “Examining Independence and Loyalty” (1999) 72 Temp. L. Rev. 857, at 863, where the author 
refers to professional independence from the client as being absolute: “It inheres in the structure of the American legal 
profession. This obligation is non-waivable by the client and non-negotiable. Indeed, two-party independence is not a 
duty to the client at all--it is a responsibility of lawyers to the legal profession.” 
 
56
 CBA Code, supra note 7, at Chapter III, “Advising Client”, Commentary 10: reminds the duty of lawyers to clearly 
advise client of any portion of their advice that is not legal advice; LSUC  Rules, supra note 7, at 2.01(1) Commentary. 
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of care and the duty to provide competent legal advice. In theory, when the duty to advise 
the client on non legal advice is complied with, it can also mitigate any misunderstanding 
on the scope to which the solicitor-client privilege may apply. 57 More generally, counsel 
may be subject to the same standard of care for business advice as the one applicable to 
legal advice.58 While it may seem possible in theory to apply the rules of professional 
conduct that require that the client be notified of the non legal portion of advice that is 
provided, this is difficult to apply in practice. Except for the formal written legal opinion 
that is usually accompanied by an extensive list of caveats and disclaimers, most 
transactional work will involve a large amount of verbal opinions, contract negotiations 
and drafts which inevitably and invariably contain a blend of legal and business 
considerations and advice and for which no formal notice is ever given. The combination 
of legal and business advice is also encouraged by a prevailing business and corporate 
culture that affects in-house counsel and outside counsel. The fact that in-house counsel 
are contextually more likely to be solicited to provide non legal advice than their outside 
counsel colleagues does not exclude that this is a reality for outside counsel as well.59 The 
business acumen of in-house counsel (and also outside counsel) is strongly valued and 
nurtured and is often a prerequisite to survive and gain respect from the client-employer 
representatives.60 Codes of Professional Conduct that require that counsel put the client 
on notice on any advice that is non legal, seem to run counter to ongoing widespread  
practices on how legal services are performed, both for in-house and outside counsel. In 
that context, the foundations and application of such rules merit reconsideration to protect 
                                                                                                                                            
 
57
 Guide 2008 de déontologie appliquée aux avocats en enterprise, supra note 8, at 13 and fol.; S.R. Weaver, supra note 
19, at 1037 and fol.; Veasey and Di Guglielmo, supra note 33, at 26.  
 
58
 Duggin, supra note 5, at 1015. Lawyers, by their professional affiliation and duties, are in some respects 
expected to conduct themselves in a manner that is above the one of the ordinary citizen: see the L.S.A. 
Code, supra note 7, at Chapter 8, Statement of Principle, which refers to applying the “highest business standards in the 
community” when a lawyer is involved in the business aspects of the practice of law. Clients, in their dealings with 
lawyers, expect that certain standards will be respected in the quality of their service: see for example the 
L.S.A. Code, supra note 7, at Chapter 1, Commentary G.1, which states that lawyers are in a “quasi-official position in 
society by virtue of privileges conferred on them by the state”. 
 
 
59
 Veasey and Di Guglielmo , supra note 33, at 27: the authors raise doubt on the extent to which outside counsel may 
provide less business advice than in-house counsel. 
60
 See the discussion in Part II C. of this paper. 
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in-house counsel, but also outside counsel, while ensuring that matters such as the 
solicitor-client privilege are properly addressed.  
 
The combination of business and legal advice or functions raises a more fundamental 
question of the ideal model of lawyering that should be encouraged by the legal 
profession: technician of the law, hired gun, gatekeeper or influential advisor? 61 In light 
of the recent securities fraud scandals and the involvement of in-house and outside 
counsel in them, this question is triggering a revived interest 62 that resonates beyond the 
existence and role of in-house counsel.63 Describing the combination of various roles and 
types of advice as a common denominator of the typical in-house counsel, Rosen noted 
more than 20 years ago that the “Inside Counsel Movement” challenged the profession on 
the degree of influence that ought to be exercised by lawyers.64 He gave the example of 
preventive law programs that may “extend too far the profession's jurisdictional claims, 
because they may require lawyers being complicit in too much non-compliance”.65 He 
also suggested that the legal profession’s endorsement of a more independent and 
influential counselor role could entail the recognition that “professional judgment 
involves not only expertise but also political judgment about how to exercise corporate 
leadership.”66 Codes of Professional Conduct currently allow significant flexibility in the 
                                               
61
 See Rosen, supra note 4, at 520, on the role of “ally to run the corporation profitably and legally”, as opposed to the 
one of a policeman that in-house counsel plays in counseling corporate client on compliance matters; M. A. Wilkinson, 
P. Mercer & T. Strong, “Mentor, Mercenary or Melding: An Empirical Inquiry Into the Role of the Lawyer” (1996) 28 
Loy. U. Chicago L.J. 373; B. A. Green, “Thoughts about Corporate Lawyers after Reading the Cigarette Papers: Has 
the “Wise Counselor” Given Way to the “Hired Gun”?” 51 De Paul L. Rev.  407 (2001); Veasey and  Di Guglielmo , 
supra note 33, at 28 and fol., discuss three distinct roles for corporate counsel : advocates, gatekeepers, or persuasive 
counselors, (opting for the latter role); for an analysis of the ability of counsel to play the role of gatekeepers, see: S. H. 
Kim, “Gatekeepers Inside Out” (2008) 21 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 411. 
 
 
 
62
 Kim, supra note 11; Duggin, supra note 5, at 1020 states that “many lawyers lost their way because of a “dual failure 
of vision.” They lost sight of the corporation itself as their true client and they saw “their role in unacceptably narrow 
terms--as mere implementers or transaction engineers, rather than as broadly-gauged corporate counselors or advisers.” 
(citing T. G. Bost, “Corporate Lawyers After the Big Quake: The Conceptual Fault Line in the Professional Duty of 
Confidentiality” (2006) 19 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1089, at 1118).  
   
63
  Rosen, supra note 4, at 530. 
 
64
 Rosen, supra note 4, at 530. 
 
65
 Ibid. 
 
66
 Ibid. 
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style of lawyering that can be adopted by counsel in providing legal services.67 It is also 
clear that by their position, in-house counsel are more likely to be solicited to provide non 
legal services, whether in an official capacity or not.68 The fluidity that the Codes of 
Professional Conduct exhibit on how counsel may provide legal advice to their client is 
also reflected by the ambiguity around the meaning of “professional independence.”69 
Raising these issues more formally to remind counsel of their professional duties may 
prove to be of great support and help clarify the ethical dilemmas that counsel, in 
particular in-house, may face in similar situations.70 More fundamentally though, the 
combination of various defined and less defined roles for in-house counsel and the ethical 
issues that this interlinking with the client itself pose, raise fundamental issues about the 
identity of lawyers in the legal profession. It raises questions on the balancing act and 
tensions that subsist between the pillar duty of loyalty to the client and the duty of 
professional independence from the client.71 At this point in time, it seems that the latter 
is overshadowed by the former.72 This partly explains the difficulty to clearly identify the 
better ethical conduct to adopt when legal and non legal functions are cumulated.  
 
C.  “Organic proximity”   
                                               
67
 For example The LSUC  Rules, supra note 7,  commentary to rule 2.02 (5.2), last paragraph, on the “up the ladder” 
reporting duties of lawyers, including in-house counsel, present various models of lawyering through the use of broad 
language: “These rules recognize that lawyers as the legal advisers to organizations are in a central position to 
encourage organizations to comply with the law and to advise that it is in the organizations' and the public's interest that 
organizations do not violate the law. Lawyers acting for organizations are often in a position to advise the executive 
officers of the organization not only about the technicalities of the law but about the public relations and public policy 
concerns that motivated the government or regulator to enact the law. Moreover, lawyers for organizations, particularly 
in-house counsel, may guide organizations to act in ways that are legal, ethical, reputable, and consistent with the 
organization's responsibilities to its constituents and to the public.” 
 
68
 Veasey and Di Guglielmo, supra note 33, at 25. 
 
69
 See discussion about the different meanings of professional independence in Part III below; M. Beaudoin, 
“Déontologie : marcher sur un fil de fer” Le Journal, Barreau du Québec 39:7 (July 2007) 9. 
 
70
 Paton, supra note 13, at 561 points out: “The ability for a lawyer in an in-house position to have a broader and more 
complex influence on corporate decision-making is both enticing and dangerous: where does the line get drawn 
between legal advice and business advice in such a context? Where should it be? How might the personal be detached 
from the professional? The goal of regulators and the profession should be to assist corporate counsel in negotiating 
their way through these issues. This is where reviewing the Rules of Professional Conduct and their application to the 
unique challenges corporate counsel confront should be a first order priority.” 
 
71
 Myers, supra note 52, at 858. 
 
72
 Ibid. 
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 Developing legal expertise and business knowledge of one single corporate client on a 
full time basis, becoming an “integral part of the business team” often enhances the 
quality of the relationship between in-house counsel and the corporation representatives, 
up to the most senior ranks of the organization. It can also lead to a non trivial 
phenomenon down the road: the in-house counsel identifies with the client73 and 
gradually becomes the client, as a result of the “organic proximity” because of its 
progressive, unwarranted, “natural” fusion. What are the perceptions and expectations of 
the role of in-house counsel and how may in-house counsel interpret and interiorize their 
role?74  
 
(i) In-house counsel representing one person and one side all the time 
 
In-house counsel’s representation of one organization at all times may expose them to 
specific ethical issues. Some in-house counsel invoke the desire to be directly connected 
to one product and to espouse the mission of their employer as a great motivator to 
practice law in-house, as well as an important differentiator from working at a law firm.75  
This particularity of in-house counsel’s entire devotion to one client begs the question of 
the ideal model of lawyering that the profession should encourage and promote.76 The 
single-client, total devotion situation of in-house counsel has been characterized as a 
variant or another manifestation of the specialization of the practice of law.77 Elite law 
firms often represent exclusively corporations and not employees (except for senior 
                                               
73
 See Kim, supra note 5, at 184: the author comments on the dual service of providing legal advice and acting as 
director on the board of the same corporation: “As attorneys identify increasingly more with their clients' interests, 
there is a concern over whether that type of identification results in a corresponding erosion of the ideal of the lawyer 
as an independent steward of the legal system.”  
 
74
 As Duggin points out: “Given the multifaceted roles contemporary general counsel play and the influence they exert, 
how these lawyers approach their responsibilities is at least as important as what they do”: Duggin, supra note 5, at 
1019. 
 
75
 See the comments by Me Gagnon in J. Landry, supra note 3, at 21. 
 
76
 Gordon, supra note 42, at 2 discusses the overspecialization of lawyers having taken precedence over a more general 
counseling function, in the broader context of his discussion on the  loss of the ideal of  Law as a public profession and 
the ideal of independence from clientele. 
 
77
  Hazard, supra note 1, at 1012. 
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management) in labor dispute cases, or pharmaceutical companies and not class actions 
on behalf of consumers in product liability cases and so forth. The main reasons invoked 
are conflicts of interest. The result is that elite law firms may also end-up representing a 
particular segment of clients, and with that, a similar context and perspective to legal 
issues most of the time. From that view, the position of in-house counsel may not be all 
that different from the one of outside counsel practicing at larger law firms.78 However, 
outside counsel get exposed to various organizations in different industries with different 
practices and philosophies which give them points of comparison amongst their clients.79 
They may more easily become aware, for example, that certain corporate strategies are 
marginal and do not represent standard corporate practice. When warning their client 
about a doubtful corporate practice, their exposure to other organizations may give them 
more credibility to the corporation-client representative. From that perspective, the 
position of outside counsel can nurture a certain distance and the ability to exercise 
critical judgment. In contrast, by being exposed to one way of thinking and doing, all the 
time, in a sense, to a single normative reference, in-house counsel may be more at risk as 
a result of gradually losing their independent professional judgment. The inherent 
paradox of in-house counsel is that their gain in knowledge, expertise, efficiency and 
competence to better serve their single-client corporation comes with the loss of the 
benefits that derive from exposure to a broader range of perspectives. For the legal 
profession, the trade-off of constant proximity to the client means less encouragement to 
look at broader interests that go beyond the immediate demands of the client. The 
question of the suitability of representing one side and one client all the time magnifies 
the tension in the legal profession between the two ideals of loyalty to the client and 
professional independence.80 What is the optimal degree of proximity, confidence and 
candor required between counsel and client to deliver the best legal advice? What is the 
breaking point where that same proximity may compromise the manner by which the 
                                               
78
 D. Markovitz, A Modern Legal Ethics, Adversary Advocacy in a Democratic Age (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2008) at 219, explains how in addition to over specialization, the American bar is split between two 
hemispheres: i.e. the lawyers representing large corporations and organizations and the ones representing individuals 
with a very small percentage of the profession ever crossing the equator (citing an empirical study by J.P. Heinz & E.O. 
Laumann, “Chicago Lawyers: The Social Structure of the Bar”, in Lawyers: a Critical Reader (Richard L. Abel ed., 
1997) 27, at 31). 
79
 Unless they work for one single client on a full time basis, which is not the norm. 
80
 Myers, supra note 52, at 860. 
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services are rendered?  Acknowledging the presence of a balancing act between gaining 
relevant expertise and knowledge about the client-corporation’s business while at the 
same time keeping enough distance to remain critical in order to deliver competent legal 
advice is one way to expose the tremendous strength and power and also significant 
vulnerability that can result from the single client-corporation environment in which they 
evolve.  
 
(ii) In-house counsel as an “integral part of the business team”  
 
One of the success factors of in-house counsel is often their ability to “become an integral 
part of the business team.” 81 This is in fact one of the most frequently invoked reason by 
lawyers who make the shift in their career from private practice to a corporate in-house 
environment.82 They find it more rewarding and stimulating to be involved in the 
business decisions and to be involved as early as possible in the business deal. As Nelson 
and Nielson point out, when counsel practice in-house “part of their professionalism lies 
in the practiced art of embracing their new clients' objectives as their own.”83 By gaining 
an intimate knowledge of their client corporation’s business, not only is it encouraged 
that in-house counsel provide input on the business aspects of a commercial agreement or 
litigation matter, but it is expected. 84 Also, as an “integral part of the business team,” 
counsel may be inclined to adopt negotiation tactics that may be acceptable from a 
                                               
81
 Kim, supra note 5, at 206 writes: “The differences between the internal motivations and attitudes of inside lawyers as 
opposed to outside lawyers should not be discounted. Inside lawyers tend to feel as though they are integral members of 
a team, and their goals are centered on furthering the long-term success of the corporate enterprise. These lawyers 
“view themselves as facilitators and expeditors of their employer's goals to a greater extent than many outside lawyers 
would.”  
 
82
 See the comments of the in-house counsel interviewed in J. Landry, supra note 3 at 21; Weaver, supra note 19 at 
1035; more generally on the various motivations that incite a lawyer to practice law in-house, see De Mott, supra note 
5, at 961 and fol.  
 
 
83
 Nelson and Nielson, supra note 6 at 489. 
84
  Veasy and Di Guglielmo, supra note 33, at 22: “General counsel's position within the corporation provides added 
value that is rarely matched by outside counsel. In-house counsel, and the general counsel in particular, usually have a 
deeper and broader knowledge of the client's business than do outside counsel. In addition, in-house counsel's skills 
may be specialized to match the corporation's needs.”; see sections below “The in-house counsel as part of the business 
team” and “The Ideal In-house counsel”.  
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business perspective but that nevertheless raise professional ethical issues.85 To what 
extent can in-house counsel’s allegiance and loyalty to the representatives of the client-
corporation unfavorably taint their professional judgment?  
 
The particular challenge for in-house, and also outside counsel, of providing legal 
services to client-corporations, is that their client is the corporation, not its 
representatives.86 However, corporations speak and act through their authorized 
representatives. The best interests of the corporation may be hard to discern at times87 
and counsel’s judgment will be inevitably influenced by how their senior representatives 
present the corporation’s interests to them.88  The question is whether “being an integral 
part of the business team” affects in-house counsel’s independent professional judgment 
to a greater extent than it does for outside counsel.89  As Deborah A.DeMott observes: 
“counsel may tend to address legal questions in a manner that pays allegiance to the 
wisdom of executive-level commitments and perspectives, even in the absence of explicit 
instructions from other members of the team.”90 Other commentators point to the “moral 
interdependence” that develops between in-house counsel and the client-corporation, 
making the disassociation of the acts of the latter from the ones of the former more 
difficult.91 As witnessed by the recent corporate scandals, in extreme cases, this sense of 
                                               
85
 The L.S.A. Code, supra note 7, at Chapter 11, “The Lawyer as Negotiator”, outlines the expected standards of  
behavior of a lawyer involved in negotiations. 
  
86
 L.S.A. Code, supra note 7, at Chapter 12, “The Lawyer in Corporate and Government Service”, Rule 1.; Québec 
Code of Ethics, supra note 7, at 3.06.05.01; Guide 2008 de déontologie appliquée aux avocats en entreprise, supra note 
8, at 7.  
  
87
 Kim, supra note 5, at 199; see however the qualifier on the best interests of the corporation in the L.S.A. Code, supra 
note 7, at Chapter 12, “The Lawyer in Corporate and Government Service”, Statement of Principle, being “as they are 
perceived by the Corporation or Government”(underscored for emphasis), suggesting that the counsel needs to defer to 
the Corporation’s appreciation of what constitute its best interest. These would need to be done in accordance with 
rules of professional ethics: see Rule 4 of Chapter 12 which states that counsel should never take instructions that 
would amount to a breach of professional ethics or that would encourage the commission of a crime or fraud.  
 
88
 Kim, supra note 5, at 257. 
 
89
 See for example Kim, supra note 5, at 199 &fol., where the author argues that the pressures of the complexity of this 
lawyer-client relationship in the organizational setting is even greater in the case of the in-house counsel.  
 
90
 DeMott, supra note 5, at 969; See also Duggin, supra note 5, at 1004 where the author raises the risks that the special 
relationship developed between in-house counsel and senior managers may compromise general counsel ability to give 
objective legal advice; see also: Kim, supra note 5, at 207. 
 
91
 Paton supra note 13, at 560 (referring to an article by R.W. Painter and J. E. Duggan, “Lawyer Disclosure of 
Corporate Fraud: Establishing a Firm Foundation” (1996) 50 SMU L. Rev. 225). 
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loyalty can turn into overzealousness and lead to a complete misreading of in-house 
counsel’s role to serve the best interests of the corporation. DeMott describes this 
phenomenon as “misdirected and excessive loyalty.”92 This sense of loyalty that develops 
between in-house counsel93 and representatives of the client-corporation may not 
necessarily be all that different from the relationship outside counsel develop with their 
key corporate clients.94 However, overtime, it is the devotion to one single client-
corporation that is likely to create a greater sense of attachment to the client-corporation’s 
representatives that may distinguish in-house counsel from outside counsel.    
The sense of belonging of in-house counsel to the business team and to the business may 
be particularly appealing, but in-house counsel commentators recognize the tensions that 
it creates with their professional duties.95 However, this factor, i.e. the “close affiliation” 
to the business team, may be countered by the fact that in-house counsel, with their multi-
facetted role96  also have to “live with the deal” and the consequences of a chosen course 
of action.97 It gives them the incentive to think about the consequences of their actions 
more thoroughly.. On the positive side, the proximity of in-house counsel to their sole 
client-corporation also enables in-house counsel to gain more easily confidence and to 
                                                                                                                                            
 
92
 De Mott, supra note 5, at 975. One extreme example of espousing the client’s cause and taking the least orthodox 
courses of action to make issues literally “go away” is illustrated in the estranged in-house counsel character of Karen 
Crowder incarnated by Tilda Swinton in the movie “Michael Clayton”. The in-house counsel of a large chemicals 
corporation ends up hiring killers to get rid of their external counsel who was about to seriously compromise the 
chemicals company’s interests in the middle of a huge environmental class action suit. It illustrates (albeit at an 
extreme level) how a totally dedicated and devout counsel to her corporation felt pushed to commit a serious crime. 
The film shows the pressures of the business culture of that fictional corporation as well as the isolation of the in-house 
counsel as important contributing factors leading her to commit those crimes.  
  
93
 And that is required of them. 
94
 Hazard points out: “Lawyers in a corporate law department, as they are often reminded, are part of the “corporate 
team.” This slogan is a claim of primary loyalty by the corporate client. Yet, it is no stronger a claim than clients 
implicitly make upon lawyers in independent practice. After all, the independent lawyer's client also can say, “What am 
I paying you for?”: Hazard, supra note 1, at 1017. 
 
95
 J. Landry, supra note 46, at 12: see the comments of Me Nollet  where he notes that while your client employer wants 
you to be “part of the team”, as in-house counsel, you can never entirely “play” with the team and need to keep a 
certain distance. 
 
96
 Including the one of enforcement, monitoring, compliance, see Part II B. “Cumulating business, quasi-legal and legal 
roles”. 
 
97
 A. Macaulay, “In the House”, Legal Transitions, National Magazines legal Career supplement, 1:1 (March 2006, see 
the comments by S. Bodley, Vice-President and Assistant General Counsel Centrica Direct Energy Toronto, whereby 
the accountability factor, i.e. having to live with the deal was one noted difference with outside counsel and even a 
motivator to make the move towards in-house practice. 
 24 
interact with more candor with the representatives of their client-corporation. This allows 
in-house counsel to provide better legal advice, positively influence the corporate client’s 
conduct towards legal compliance, and even mitigate and reduce the likelihood of illegal 
actions being committed.98 Some in-house counsel, drawing on their personal experience, 
perceive their ability to influence persons of power to be much greater than if they were 
practicing law as outside counsel.99  This special relationship of confidence and candor 
between counsel (including outside counsel) and the client (through the corporation’s 
representatives) is also thought to be made possible in great part because of an almost 
absolute duty of confidentiality of the lawyer to the benefit of her client. In Canada, the 
exceptions to the duty of confidentiality in favor of the client are indeed very limited.100  
Although outside counsel can also develop relationships of confidence and great quality 
of communication channels with their corporate client, in-house counsel, by their mere 
physical presence, sole dedication to one client and network connection to the 
communication channels of their corporation will inevitably always have access to more 
information than outside counsel ever will. Hazard describes it as the “water cooler” 
phenomenon.101 
 
                                               
98
 A. Chayes & A. H. Chayes, supra note 6 at 283 describe how the “informal legal contact” may offer even greater 
opportunity of “anticipatory law” than when inside counsel is involved in the formal strategic process (which the 
authors also consider an important aspect of in-house counsel role in positively influencing management decision).  
See J. Landry, supra note 42, at. 8, for example, the comments of Me Y. Gauthier. 
99
 See J. Landry, supra note 42, at 8, comments of Me Y. Gauthier, where he states that when confronted to undesirable 
directions by the corporation, he would feel at ease to involve several corporation representatives and influence a 
change in the course of action. His view is that he would not have been able to achieve the same results as outside 
counsel. 
 
100
 In Canada, there are generally three exceptions to the duty of confidentiality to the client: (i) the public safety 
exception  (to prevent someone about to commit a crime that is likely to cause bodily harm), (ii) when specifically 
“required by law” or (iii) when counsel needs to make his case against the client for example to defend himself, or in a 
claim for unpaid fees for services rendered : CBA Code, surpra note 8, at Chapter IV, Confidentiality; see also L.S.A. 
Code, supra note 7, at Chapter 7 rule 8 (c) has a rule broader than public safety as it allows to lift the confidentiality 
obligations towards the client to prevent the commission “of any other crime”; LSBC Rules, supra note 21, at Chapter 
V, rule 12; L.S.U.C. Rules, supra note 7, at 2.03 (2) to (5); Québec Code of Ethics, supra note 7, at 3.06.01.01. 
 
101
 Hazard, supra note 1 at 1019: “Here lies the most significant difference between corporate counsel and lawyers in 
independent practice. The difference, simply stated, is in the factual conditions of their day-to-day work. To put the 
point bluntly, a lawyer in independent practice is sheltered from the informal, back-channel information that flows 
around the company water cooler. Instead, engagement of an independent law firm is necessarily predicated on a 
distillation of the facts about the matter in question. This is so even when the outside lawyer is given all of the 
documents and access to all of the company employees. Back-channel information simply cannot be recreated. And 
there are times, I have been told, when outside counsel may be retained on the basis of selected facts precisely to 
accommodate a response that provides a desired outside opinion.” 
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There is a certain appeal for counsel to be involved in every step of the business deal up 
to its conclusion. The perception is that counsel is then better positioned to influence the 
business deal favorably from both a business and legal perspective than the lawyer 
requested to do the paper work in the 11th hour. 102 However, the advantage of in-house 
counsel over outside counsel in the level of information that is accessible to them103 can 
also become a liability and place in-house counsel in a less enviable position and with 
greater ethical dilemmas than their outside counsel colleagues.104 When actions of the 
client-corporation come under scrutiny, in-house counsel may be in a more difficult 
position to prove that they were not aware of the actions under attack. 105 As Sarah 
Helene Duggin writes, after reviewing studies of both inside and outside counsel 
behavior that suggest that they make decisions based on “what it takes to survive and 
advance” in their environment: “These studies highlight the importance of aligning the 
objectives of both business managers and business lawyers with those of society. Shared 
objectives need to include a strong sense of the importance of complying with the law. In 
the end, perhaps the most useful aspect of Sarbanes-Oxley and the SEC implementing 
rules is not the resulting procedural mechanism but the clear message that norms are not 
fungible and that business managers and corporate attorneys need to work together to 
ensure corporate integrity.”106 Ultimately, the proper manner to address the risks posed 
by this close proximity between in-house and also outside counsel and their client-
corporation representatives is tributary of the weight that the legal profession is willing to 
give to the duty of professional independence from the client.107  
 
                                               
102
 See however De Mott, supra note 5, at 968 where the author points to the negative aspects of being involved too 
early: “… to the extent general counsel participates at an early stage in shaping major transactions and corporate policy, 
counsel's ability to bring detached, professional judgment to bear in assessing their legality may be compromised, 
especially when the question of legality is tinged in shades of gray as opposed to black and white.”  
 
103
 Gordon, supra note 42 at 53: the author describes the fragmentation of information that outside counsel are left with 
given the increased power of general counsel through increased internal knowledge and their piece meal outsourcing of 
legal services. 
 
104
 Hazard, supra note 1, at 1017. 
  
105
 See Veasey and  Di Guglielmo, supra note 33, at 24, who also points out that the expectation and assumption that 
general counsel ought to know everything may at times be completely unjustified. 
   
106
 Duggin, supra note 5, at 1039. 
 
107
 The duty of professional independence from the client is discussed in Part III of this paper. 
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(iii) The “ideal” in-house counsel   
 
In addition to in-house counsel’s unique position encouraging them to “be an integral part 
of the business team”,108 one phenomenon specific to in-house counsel is the conceptions 
and expectations that transpire from their organization’s culture that shape the “ideal” in-
house counsel. Even though each organization has its own culture, the literature suggests 
common traits of the “ideal” in-house counsel. The question is: how do these 
expectations shape in-house counsel’s practice of the law?  How may they influence their 
ethical behavior? Ideal in-house counsel as viewed by CEOs and CLOs109 are often 
described as having great business minds combined with pragmatic legal analysis skills, a 
great knowledge of the company’s culture and of its operations, markets and 
challenges.110 They are also very pro-active111 and a “take charge” person. Corporation 
representatives typically loathe the “can’t do” attitude.112 They prefer someone who is 
creative and solution oriented, and who works with the business representatives to 
overcome any “legal hurdles” that may come along the way.113 One President described 
the role of his in-house counsel as follows: they are “maestro with tainted glasses”: 
explaining that they need to play more than one instrument and that they cannot easily 
say no to a request from senior executives.114    
 
                                               
108
 See section C (ii) of this Part II above “The in-house counsel as an “integral part of the business team””.  
  
109
  For a review of the attributes valued by corporate clients of their in-house counsel see Daly, supra note 4, at 678-
679. 
 
110
 J. Landry, supra note 46, at 12, see the comments of Me Desjardins.  
 
111
 For a discussion on pro-active lawyering as particularly prevalent in in-house counsel culture, see Veasey and Di 
Guglielmo, supra note 33, at 23. 
 
112
 See L. Vadnais, supra note 40, at 20, comments made by Jacques Parisien, President of Astral Media Radio. 
113
 In Nelson and Nielson supra note 6, at 460 and 490, analyzing the results of interviews performed 54 lawyers, the 
authors explain how in-house counsel identify with their business and how they constantly adapt their roles to the needs 
of their business. Lawyers are influenced by the reaction of business people to their legal advice and this influences the 
way in which they will provide legal advice the next time: “When lawyers are criticized by business people or when 
businesspeople resist legal advice in various ways (by not going to lawyers at all, or by choosing to go to a different 
lawyer within the corporation, or by complaining to higher ups that the lawyers are not “team players”) it affects how 
the lawyer will behave the next time. Although we have emphasized the ways corporate counsel “construct” their roles, 
it is important to recognize that this is a reciprocal process among the lawyers, their “clients,” and other members of top 
management.” 
 
114
 Comments by Jacques Parisien, CEO of Astral Media Radio reported in L. Vadnais, supra note 40, at 20. 
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The in-house counsel qualities described above contain great ingredients to create the 
competent, client focused, timely and cost effective lawyering that the legal profession 
strongly promotes and aspires to. The pro-activeness and mitigation work components of 
in-house counsel can also promote broader public interests such as encouraging and 
ensuring a higher level of obedience of the law by corporate actors.115 At the same time, 
we need to ask whether on the contrary the ideal of the in-house counsel can create 
immense pressures that may lead in-house counsel to misunderstand their role and depart 
from their professional duties, making them more vulnerable than outside counsel?     
Can the great business mind combined with the desire to please (even more so for an in-
house counsel with short foresight and lack of experience) lead an individual to take even  
greater risks than the competent lawyer would do, espousing the very essence of the 
corporation’s “risk taking DNA”? 116 Similarly, is the pressure to make the issues go 
away, as a testimonial of in-house counsel’s wit and efficiency, likely to create more 
professional conduct issues for in-house counsel than for an outside counsel?117 There is 
some empirical evidence, and my personal experience supports that evidence, that many 
in-house counsel are anxious not to be perceived as road blocks. 118 This state of mind 
and the pressure felt around not providing any advice that may lead to that perception 
may explain the (passive) role that some in-house counsel played in recent corporate 
scandals.119  Thus, the “ideal” in-house counsel, from a legal ethics perspective, may not 
always corroborate with the “ideal” in-house counsel as viewed from the employer-client 
                                               
115
  Kim, supra note 5, at 251: “Corporate lawyers in particular have the unique ability to represent the legal system to 
the client and thereby fulfill their public-oriented functions. When corporate lawyers perform their duties responsibly, 
corporations can function more effectively, and given the central role that corporations play in society, the effective 
performance of the corporation results in a greater public good.”  
 
116
 J. Landry, supra note 3, at 40, see the discussion amongst in-house counsel on the importance of internal support 
within the legal department, especially with respect to more junior lawyers, who may have more difficulty to push back 
on the unreasonable demands of a client. 
 
117
 Paton, supra note 13, at 544: the author’s research into the L.S.U.C. cases of professional conduct does not suggest 
greater disciplinary actions against in-house counsel than for outside counsel. 
 
118
 See Duggin supra note 7, at 1021-1022, referring to the empirical study by Nelson and Nielson, supra note 6. 
119
 Veasey and Di Guglielmo, supra note 33, at 26: “A corporate culture that emphasized getting the deal done quickly 
with too little regard for getting the deal done in an ethically and legally appropriate manner-and company lawyers' 
inability or unwillingness to apply the brakes-may have been a factor contributing to the corporate scandals around the 
turn of the twenty-first century. The pressure on general counsel and other in-house counsel to enable rather than 
“inhibit” deals may be strong in those companies where managers are particularly skeptical about the value of the legal 
department.”  
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corporation representatives, or more importantly, as perceived by in-house counsel. As 
Duggin points out, general counsel often enjoy enviable positions in senior ranks of their 
client-corporation and consequently, they should use that authority to impose high ethical 
standards and provide the necessary support to all in-house counsel (under their 
supervision) in addressing ethical matters.120 Concrete means to encourage that behavior 
and to address structural issues that may have opposite effects need to be considered.121 
 
(iv) The substitution phenomenon 
 
We already discussed the risk of cumulating business with legal roles in one person and 
how this could raise conflicts of interest.122 The “substitution phenomenon” is one 
instance of cumulating business and legal functions, where the lawyer takes the business 
decision in her hands without even consulting another corporation representative. In such 
cases the in-house counsel acts as agent of the corporation and is no longer in a mere 
advisory role.123 The substitution phenomenon is more likely to occur in a transaction 
intimately intertwined with a heavy legal component, where no apparent business unit 
has accountability. This may lead counsel to perceive (whether rightly so or not) that 
there is no person in the organization more competent than the in-house counsel to make 
the decision. Therefore, in-house counsel  feel empowered to make the decisions without 
any other consultation. This can also be fuelled by a desire to show initiative and 
efficiency, by not encumbering business colleagues with legalese and hence to truly “add 
value” to the Corporation.124  A similar but quite distinct situation occurs when in-house 
counsel act in a non legal capacity such as when they need to perform purchasing 
                                               
120
 Duggin supra note 7, at 1022-1023. 
 
121
 See the discussion in Part IV of this paper. 
122
 Part II, B. “Cumulating business, quasi-legal and legal roles”. 
 
123This situation is to be distinguished with cases where counsel overrides client instructions and decides to act as she 
thinks would be the proper handling of the case. This is what authors as Wilkinson, Walker and Mercer describe as 
acting as surrogate for the client, which, as the authors point out, should raise concern, especially when representing a 
physical person, as counsel goes beyond representing her client: Wilkinson, Walker and Mercer, supra note 29 at 180 
and  190.  
 
124
 On the ideal behaviors of the in-house counsel, see section C (iii) below: The “ideal” in-house counsel. 
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functions for the legal department.125  In his article on “The Inside Counsel Movement”, 
Rosen talks about the substitution phenomenon as one that is likely to arise with outside 
counsel as well. He also suggests that the in-house counsel intrinsic knowledge of the 
corporation they serve positions them to make better decisions in the name of the client 
than the outside counsel.126 The substitution phenomenon is also manifest in the 
relationship between inside and outside counsel, the latter often being the sole voice of 
the “client”.127 It is perfectly conceivable that when counsel substitute themselves for the 
client-corporation, they do so while representing the best interests of the client-
corporation, without an organization representative being part of the decision leading to 
it. This is so provided that in-house counsel act within the constraints of the general 
agency relationship that is then being created. In a way, the substitution phenomenon 
may even make it easier for in-house counsel to act adequately in the best interests of the 
corporation, as in such case, there is no intermediary representative between them and the 
client organization that could eventually taint their professional judgment unfavorably.  
 
D. Remuneration for legal services rendered  
 
The salaried status of in-house counsel to a single corporation employer and other 
monetary  incentives may increase ethical dilemmas for in-house counsel. 128 How can 
this remuneration structure affect the receiver of legal services (i.e. the client-corporation 
and its business representatives) and the counsel-client relationship? Does it create 
additional ethical concerns?  In-house counsel’s remuneration as salaried employees has 
at least four consequences on the manner by which the legal services are delivered. First, 
                                               
125
 The L.S.A. Code, supra note 7, at Chapter 8, “Lawyer in the business aspects of practice”,  provide that when 
involved in the business aspects of the practice of the law, counsel ought to employ the highest business standards in 
the community. 
 
126
 Rosen, supra note 4, at 517: “The frailties of organization, in addition to the uncertainties of translation, help explain 
why corporations need inside counsel managers. Outside counsel are not as well situated as inside counsel to determine 
efficiently corporate goals from their client contacts.” 
 
127
 On the fact that corporation clients value such substitution, Rosen, supra note 4, at 518-519 explains: “Since inside 
counsel are specialists in the legal needs of their corporation, they can manage outside counsel's ignorance: They can 
assume responsibility for organizing, monitoring and auditing outside counsel's work.” 
 
128
 See the discussion above in this Part II, A “The in-house counsel as salaried employee of a single corporate client”. 
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in-house counsel are primarily concerned with managing the work volume and the risk 
associated to it. They have no parallel pressure to manage the amount of billable hours 
that they perform in a year.129 They are usually incented to and rewarded for providing 
legal services in a most efficient manner, unencumbered by personal conflict of interest 
that may arise from revenue targets.130 From that perspective, in-house counsel can 
exercise a strong independent judgment in the breadth of the legal services that are 
required in the best interests of the client-corporation. Second, by not being billed for 
legal services, the business representatives of the client corporation may be more inclined 
to do “counsel shopping” (assuming that there is a medium to large in-house counsel 
legal department) to get the more favorable legal opinion. Outside counsel are not foreign 
to the phenomenon of “lawyer shopping” either. The unfavorable ethical behavior that 
may ensue from such practice will largely depend on the legal environment of in-house 
counsel. In a centralized legal department where there is consistency and good 
communication channels between in-house counsel, such situation can be remedied fairly 
quickly.131 In an environment where in-house counsel would not feel supported by their 
fellow in-house counsel in taking difficult stances towards the client-corporation 
representatives, this may create additional and possibly detrimental pressures on in-house 
counsel’s independent professional judgment. By taking a position they know will not be 
supported by their in-house department, they may also fear to undermine the credibility 
of their department towards management. This last comment points to consistency of 
service that are common to many organizations and do not only concern in-house counsel 
in legal departments. Third, client-corporation representatives may create unmanageable 
work load demands as a result of not having to pay directly for the legal services being 
offered to them. This may place in-house counsel’s professional duty to deliver 
                                               
129
 On a related issue, see : L. J. Fox, “MDPs Done Gone: The Silver Lining in the Very Black Enron Cloud”, (2002) 
44 Ariz. L. Rev. 547, at 554  and the author discussion  against the instauration of Multi disciplinary practice (MDPs) 
because of the additional financial pressures it would place on outside counsel independent professional judgment. 
 
130
 For example a personal conflict of interest could arise for the outside counsel asked to provide an opinion on the 
likelihood of success of a legal claim. In grey area cases, the prospect of securing a substantive amount of work in the 
future may be one of the factors influencing outside counsel to recommend litigation. 
 
131
 Formalizing uniform approaches to certain contractual clauses or legal issues that the employer-client often faces is 
an effective approach to ensure consistency amongst the in-house counsel opinions and diminish the tendency of 
“counsel shopping”. The impact of the structure of in-house legal departments is discussed below in Part II E. “In-
house counsel legal and departmental environment”. 
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competent legal services in a timely fashion to a strenuous test. Charging business 
representatives for the legal services delivered though inter corporate transfers is 
sometimes used to moderate the flow of legal services demands. However, such measures 
can also discourage the business representatives to seek out legal advice132 and lead to a 
decentralization and loss of control over legal services performed. Work overload in an 
in-house counsel environment should not be underestimated.133  Factors which may 
lessen in-house counsel’s ability to control volume of work include: their physical 
proximity to the client representatives, and as stated above, the fact that there is no legal 
fee for the services rendered. This can, if not managed properly give rise to an overflow 
of demands from the employer-client organization. A counsel who does not have the 
time, the expertise or the means to deliver legal services is in potential breach of her 
professional duties.134 The complexity of the multi-facetted practice of in-house counsel 
requires strong professional judgment. It must also be supported by rigorous mechanisms 
in place to prioritize the work by degree of importance and minimize low risk, repetitive 
or trivial requests.135  Last but not least, the significant increase in the proportion of in-
house counsel in the legal profession is undeniably related to the market realization that 
in-house counsel can provide legal services of high quality at much lower costs than 
outside counsel.136 This means a broader access to legal services to small and medium 
sized entities who could otherwise not afford legal services. On that front, in-house 
counsel serve an important goal of the profession to increase access to legal services, at 
least to the corporation segment of the constituents they are meant to serve.  
                                               
132
 Duggin, supra note 5, at 1017 describes how in-house counsel often need to perform the functions of “legal services 
marketer”, i.e. that they need to justify their existence and their value add in a corporate environment. 
 
133
 The danger of the lack of resources and support has been raised as a potential risk in the in-house counsel practice 
environment: see J. Landry, supra note 3, at 40, the comments by Me Lebeau.  
 
134
 The duty of competence and integrity could be compromised: CBA Code, supra note 7, at Chapter I and Chapter II; 
L.S.A. Code, supra note 7, at Chapter 2; LSBC Rules, supra note 21, at chapter 2 and chapter 3; Québec Code of 
Ethics, supra note 7, rule 3.00.01 and 3.01.01. 
  
135
 Alleviating ethical issues resulting from an unmanageable volume of work is largely tributary of the support that in-
house counsel get from their legal department: see discussion in Part II. E “In-house counsel legal and departmental 
environment”. 
 
136
 J. Landry, supra note 3, at 40: see the comments by several in-house counsel on the calculations made by their 
corporations favoring hiring more in-house counsel rather than outsourcing legal services to law firms on the basis of a 
cost-benefit analysis.  
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E. In-house counsel legal and departmental environment  
 
The structure of  in-house counsel’s legal department can significantly contribute to 
alleviating the ethical dilemmas and even to minimizing the risk of professional 
misconduct by in-house counsel.137 Finding the right balance between centralized and 
decentralized legal services can ensure the proper level of awareness and control of legal 
and ethical issues as they arise.138 It also allows general counsel and in-house counsel to 
deliver the level of legal services that are required in the best interests of the client-
corporation. Centralization also ensures a greater communication between in-house 
counsel which in turn can provide better support to in-house counsel to navigate through 
an array of complex co-existing and often conflicting roles.  This can help in-house 
counsel maintain a clearer perspective on their work and duties and hence support greater 
professional independence.139 The extent to which such mechanisms (other than the 
formal up the ladder reporting obligations for public companies in the U.S.) are common 
practice is hard to determine. It seems reasonable to presume that in the often high-
volume and pressured environment of in-house legal departments, education about and 
support for discussions on ethical issues may be overlooked.140 My own experience as in-
house counsel is that although such training or discussion of ethical issues was not 
discouraged per se. they were not part of any formal or informal training that was made 
available to in-house counsel. In contrast, the outside counsel environment is more likely 
to have mechanisms in place to address at least some of the ethical issues that may 
arise.141 
                                               
137
 Veasey and Di Guglielmo, supra note 33, at 31, where the authors discuss the merits (but also the pitfalls) of in-
house counsel monitoring their company’s use of legal services and how it could indicate trends of 
compartmentalization of legal services which could raise some red flags.  
 
 
138
 For a discussion on legal department structures (i.e. centralized and decentralized) see De Mott, supra note 5, at 969; 
see also Veasey and Di Guglielmo, supra note 33, at 35.  
 
139
 Hazard describes how general counsel should be unequivocal on the steps to follow and on the support their legal 
team gets when facing potential ethical issues: Hazard, supra note 1, at 1021-1022.   
 
140
 Weaver, supra note 19, at 1050. 
141
 This is more likely to be the case in medium to larger size law firms than in smaller ones. One of such widespread 
system and practice is the verification of any conflicts of interest before accepting a new mandate. 
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A critical aspect of in-house counsel’s abilities to deliver competent legal advice in the 
best interests of the client-corporation relates to their relationship with and access to 
outside counsel. Workload issues or lack of expertise in specific areas of the law often 
requires the assistance of outside counsel. Legal department budget pressures may come 
in the way of making a decision that is in the best interests of the corporation.142 Such 
pressures143 may lead misguided counsel to take undue risks and take the matter in their 
own hands even if they lack the availability or necessary expertise.144  This can arise 
when in-house counsel would perceive the immediate budget constraints of their legal 
department as more important than the interests of the client-corporation to receive 
competent legal advice in a timely manner. Departmental budget pressures may also lead 
counsel to select the nature of legal services that they will handle internally as opposed to 
those they will refer to outside counsel not so much on the basis of required expertise, but 
on the basis of how the outside counsel expense will be recorded from an accounting 
perspective.145 In their relationship with outside counsel, in-house counsel, as agents of 
the corporation, become the “purchaser” of legal services.146 The selection process, as in 
any supply transaction, may raise conflicts of interest issues that in-house counsel should 
be mindful of.147  
                                               
142
 In their empirical study of corporate counsel, Nelson and Nielson report how the three types of ideal counsel studied 
directly felt the bottom line pressures of their corporation and how they had to meet their business objectives: see 
Nelson and Nielson, supra note 6 at 472. This can translate into feeling the undue pressure of meeting your own legal 
department budget objectives. 
 
143
 Coupled with some of the attributes that are expected of the “ideal” in-house counsel, such as resourcefulness, take 
charge attitudes, effectiveness, see Part II C (iii) “The “ideal” in-house counsel””. 
 
144
 For a discussion on the ethical duties of in-house counsel facing budget pressures, see Veasey and Di Guglielmo, 
supra note 33at 35, where the authors note: “Counsel must resist budget pressures that have the effect of denying 
needed legal advice to some operations. General counsel may have a duty in certain circumstances to assert persuasive 
“lobbying” with the CFO and the CEO and, if necessary, take the matter up with the board. It may also be important to 
inform the board of directors, if necessary, that some needed legal advice has not been provided because of budget 
constraints.” 
 
145
 De Mott also suggests that the justification of the size of their legal department (and maintaining it) may influence 
General counsel (even unconsciously) decision to retain or not outside counsel, which may not always be in the best 
interest of the client corporation: De Mott, supra note 5, at 972.  
  
146
  See for example Daly, supra note 4, at 686 & fol.: the author describes the “purchasing agent” functions of an in-
house counsel. 
 
147
 Even though in that case counsel is not performing legal advice per se, he would likely be bound by the conflict of 
interest rules of professional conduct, either by his supervisory role of delegation for legal services, or by the fact that 
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The contextual analysis of in-house counsel presented here leads me to conclude on the 
one hand that the privileged position of in-house counsel in the intimacy, expertise and 
knowledge with/of the employer client-corporation can also be a burden.  The lack of 
proper breathing distance may weaken their ability to take unpopular stands and to 
maintain a broader and more detached view and to focus excessively on the immediate 
needs of the client. The outside counsel can provide legal advice more from a distance 
and in a more and more specialized fashion, and with an awareness of the landscape and 
context in which such advice is sought. From that perspective, the in-house counsel may 
be at a disadvantage. This analysis also reveals that while in-house counsel ethical 
dilemmas may be higher than the ones of outside counsel, the difference may not be as 
significant as would appear at first sight. Outside counsel also face ethical dilemmas that 
can vary in nature or in degree from the ones of in-house counsel.  
 
On the other hand, in-house counsel are well positioned, and in some cases perhaps even 
better than outside counsel, to incarnate the core ideals of the legal profession and to 
fulfill their professional duties towards the client. In-house counsel are positioned 
favorably to fulfill their duty of loyalty to the client and to provide legal services in a 
competent and diligent manner.148 Their undivided attention as well as the expertise they 
develop with respect to the operations of their client can significantly increase the quality 
and effectiveness of their service. Their position allows them to develop and nurture a 
relationship of confidence with the representatives of their client-corporation that can 
give them access to more important and timely information. This in turn can allow them 
to provide effective legal advice that can have important preventive value and that can 
better serve their client and even the public. The combination of legal, quasi-legal and 
business functions often includes responsibilities to ensure legal compliance and 
monitoring, as well as the timely implementation of new laws as they are adopted. 
Providing legal services at significantly lower costs than outside counsel, increases access 
                                                                                                                                            
such ethical conduct is also required in the performance of non legal services: see above discussion in Part II. B. 
“Cumulating legal, quasi-legal and business roles”. 
 
148
 This is provided that the proper legal department structure and support are in place as discussed in 
subsection D. and E. of this Part II. 
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to legal services for corporations who could otherwise not afford to do so. For these 
reasons, and based on my own personal experience, the practice of law in-house needs to 
be promoted rather than discouraged. To that end, adequate guidance and support by the 
self-regulated legal profession is necessary to ensure that the vulnerabilities resulting 
from in-house counsel’s structural environment do not overshadow the advantages that it 
provides. At the same time, this guidance should also seek to alleviate those 
vulnerabilities that are common at varying degrees to outside counsel. The next steps 
require us to look at whether the legal profession currently provides such support and 
guidance. More particularly, what are the various duties of professional independence, in 
nature and in scope, how much weight is attributed to those duties, and what impacts 
does it have on the regulation of in-house and outside counsel?   
 
III. The Pivotal Significance of the Duty of Professional Independence  
 
The adequate regulation of in-house counsel and outside counsel depends in large part on 
understanding the nature and situating the place of the duty of professional independence 
from the client within the legal profession. Without the existence of such a clear duty, 
there is a priori no reason to regulate in-house counsel differently from outside counsel. 
If on the other hand, such a duty exists, the contextual approach elaborated in Part II of 
this paper raises some concerns that are more specific to in-house counsel. It also 
illustrates areas of concern for outside counsel that vary in nature or in degree.    
 
Professional independence refers to at least three distinct meanings that can create 
confusion about its exact role in the legal profession. Codes of Professional Conduct, 
refer predominantly to two meaning of “professional independence” as the independence 
(i) from the state (both at the level of the profession and at the individual level) and (ii) 
from any influences external to the client that may impair a lawyer’s judgment in 
providing legal advice. A third meaning of professional independence is professional 
independence from the client. The first meaning of independence, i.e. of the bar and the 
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legal profession as a whole from any state interference,149 is the main justification of the 
self-regulation of the legal profession. For instance, the adoption by U.S. Congress of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the obligations it imposes directly on in-house and 
outside counsel has been criticized by many as an encroachment on the independence of 
the legal profession.150   In its second meaning, the duty of independence has spurred the 
development of detailed duties to avoid conflicts of interests (whether they arise from 
another client or a personal situation, including doing business with the client who is 
soliciting advice) and of established mechanisms on how to address such conflicts when 
they arise.151 This second meaning of independence refers to circumstances in which the 
lawyer may be in breach of her duty of loyalty to the client.152 Critical to the particular 
position of in-house counsel vis-à-vis their client-corporation, is the third meaning of 
professional independence: i.e. the duty to remain at all times independent from the 
client153 and from her cause, i.e. “the lawyer standing apart from the client and giving 
detached, objective advice, fully informed by the law, experience, and the practical 
ramifications of the client's situation”,154 balancing the lawyer’s obligations beyond those 
owed to the client, i.e. to the profession, to the courts and the public interest.  The 
distinction between the second type of  professional independence (i.e. more akin to the 
duty of loyalty owed to the client ) and the third type, i.e. independence from the client  is 
                                               
149
  See the CBA Code, supra note 7, at Chapter XXII, Independence of the Bar. The Independence of the Bar from any 
state interference was characterized as one of the “hallmarks of a free society” by the Supreme Court of Canada in A.G. 
Can v. Law Society of B.C., [1982] 2 S.C.R. 307 at 335; For a  recent discussion on the importance of the independence 
of the Bar, see the Remarks of the Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, P.C. Chief Justice of Canada, “Professional 
Independence and the Rule of Law” (2007) 23 Windsor Rev. Legal & Soc. Issues,  3; 
 
150
 Paton supra note 13, at 539-540 refers to Canadian law firms opposing to state intervention and regulation 
encroaching upon profession self regulation.  
151
 Another duty that flows from the duty of independence of the lawyer is exemplified by the rules dealing with 
outside interests to the practice of law: the CBA Code, supra note 7, at chapter VII Rule on “Outside interest and the 
practice of law”; see also Chapter XXII, Independence of the Bar, where it cites the following duties of the lawyer as 
manifestations of the Independence of the Bar: the duty of integrity, of honesty and candor, the duty of confidentiality 
and the duty to represent the client resolutely and fearlessly.  
 
152
 Myers, supra note 52 at 861.   
 
153
 Myers, supra note 52, at 862: the author notes that “In contrast to independence from the state, independence from 
clients is a much more debated and elusive ideal.” 
 
154
 Myers, supra note 52, at 860.  
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described by Eleanor W. Myers respectively as the “three-party” v. “two-party” model.155 
The three-party model refers to three involved parties, e.g. counsel, the client and a third 
party, while the two-party model refers to the relationship between counsel and her client. 
Myers observes that referring to “independence” for two quite distinct meanings, the first 
one focusing more on loyalty to the client and the second one referring more to a distance 
from the client:  “obscures the differences between them.” She further suggests that “[it] 
may also lead to a failure to acknowledge the tension between loyalty and independence. 
Concealing that tension may favor one value over the other. For example, an overly 
mechanical application of the conflict of interest rules, which are designed, in part, to 
assure independence from third-party interests to preserve loyalty to clients, has the 
potential to undermine counsel’s independence from the client (the two-party model).” 156   
 
The greater emphasis placed on this duty of independence from the client leads certain 
European bars to view the practice of law and working as employee for a single client, as 
two incompatible functions. As recently stated by the Court of First Instance of the 
European Communities in the Akzo157 case: “The requirement as to the position and 
status as an independent lawyer…..is based on a concept of the lawyer’s role as 
collaborating in the administration of justice by the courts and as being required to 
provide, in full independence, and in the overriding interests of the administration of 
justice, such legal assistance as the client needs.”158  The test adopted by the Court to 
assess whether legal advice was provided in full independence was that the legal advice 
“was provided by a lawyer who, structurally, hierarchically and functionally, is a third 
party in relation to the undertaking receiving that advice.”159 Bar regulations singling out 
in-house counsel on that basis illustrate that a greater emphasis is placed, at least in 
                                               
155
 Myers, supra note 52, at 861; as the author also points out at 858: “Independence in the sense that many are using it, 
meaning independence from third-party interests, both obscures the tension between loyalty and independence and 
overlooks independence from the client as one of the important aspects of the lawyer's professional obligations”. 
 
156
 Myers, supra note 52, at 861. 
 
157
 Supra note 14. 
 
158
 Ibid, at par.166, this decision was affirmed by the Grand Chamber in September 2010, supra note 15. 
 
159
 Ibid, at par.168, similar conclusions were reached by the Grand Chamber, in the Akzo case, Grand Chamber, supra 
note 15, paragraphs 45 to 48. 
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theory, in overriding interests of the administration of justice than it is the case with bars 
that do not make a distinction between in-house and outside counsel.160 Whether this 
marked differentiation between how in-house and outside counsel are regulated is the 
ideal model in practice is another question.,161  
 
While our Codes of Professional Conduct abound with examples of the “Three-party” 
model of professional independence,162 the “Two-party” model, the one that refers to a 
certain restraint from the client, is not as explicitly outlined (to use the categorization 
models of Myers).163 The “Two-party” model of professional independence needs to be 
inferred by the overall content and general intent of Codes of Professional Conduct, and 
the presence of duties that may compete with the several professional duties that flow 
from the core obligation to preserve the client’s interest. Indeed, the lawyer owes a duty 
to the state, to the courts, to the client, to the profession, to her colleagues and to 
herself.164 To fulfill those parallel and contemporaneous duties, the lawyer inevitably has 
                                               
160
 For a comparative analysis between French legal ethics and American and English legal ethics, see, J. Leubsdorf, 
Man in His Original Dignity, Legal ethics in France (Darthmouth, Ashgate, 2001) at pp.13-28, in particular, on the 
requirement of independence from the client.  
161
 As I discuss throughout Part II of this paper, while issues of independence from the client may arise 
more frequently for in-house counsel, they are not unique to them and may be present with outside counsel 
as well. This raises some doubt as to whether impeaching in-house counsel from being members of their 
bar is justified and adequately addresses the issue of professional independence from the client.  
162
 References to independence point towards the duty to be free from any interference to unequivocally serve the 
interests of the client such as the absence of any conflicts of interest with another client, between the lawyer and the 
client, or any other outside factor that may impair the lawyer judgment in providing legal services to the client.  See for 
example the rules dealing with conflict of interests: CBA Code, supra note 7, at Chapter V and VI; LSUC  Rules, supra 
note 7, at 2.04 to 2.06; L.S.B.C. Code, supra note 20, at Chapter 6 and 7; L.S.A. Code, supra note 7, at Chapter 6, 
commentary G.3 which are mainly geared towards preserving the client interest; performing non legal functions: L. 
S.U. C. Rules, supra note 8, at 6.04; The CBA Code, supra note 7, at Chapter VII; L.S.A. Code, supra note 7, at 
Chapter 15.  
 
163
 Myers, supra note 52, at 861; the L.S.B.C. Code Supra note 21, is more explicit on the parallel and 
contemporaneous interests that the lawyer needs to serve in addition to the client interests: see Chapter 1 “Canons of 
Legal Ethics”; the Québec Code of Ethics, supra note 7, 3.06.05: “An advocate shall safeguard his professional 
independence regardless of the circumstances in which he engages in his professional activities. In particular, he must 
not let his professional judgment be subject to pressure exerted on him by anyone whomsoever.”;  Rule 3.00.01 states 
that  “ An advocate owes the client a duty of skill as well as obligations of loyalty, integrity, independence, impartiality, 
diligence and prudence”.    
  
164
 Smith, supra note 3, at 16 and fol.; the L.S.B.C. Code, Supra, note 20, at Chapter 1 “Canons of Legal Ethics”; see 
also the L.S.A. Code, supra note 7, at Chapter 1, Rule 1., which states that  the lawyer must uphold the law in 
delivering advice to the client;  see the CBA Code, supra note 7,  preamble: “The essence of professional responsibility 
is that the lawyer must act at all times uberrimae fidei, with utmost good faith to the court, to the client, to other 
lawyers, and to members of the public.”, as well as at Chapter XIII The Lawyer and the Administration of Justice, 
Chapter XV Responsibility to the Profession Generally, Chapter XVI Responsibility to lawyers and others, and Chapter 
XX No Discrimination, which all enumerate duties of professional and ethical conduct that exemplify parallel and 
potentially conflicting duties with the lawyer duties geared towards serving and preserving the client interests. 
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to maintain a certain degree of independence from the client and her cause.165 A proper 
application of these rules, it seems, would be facilitated by an order of priority or 
hierarchy between parallel and simultaneous duties in case they conflict with one and the 
other. Some commentators argue that the first duty of the lawyer is to the state or more 
generally, the public interest.166 If there is such a paramount duty that sits higher in the 
hierarchy of the professional duties of lawyers, one that encapsulates the duty of 
professional independence from the client, our Codes of Professional Conduct do not 
reflect it. By contrast, the emphasis that our Codes of Professional Conduct put on the 
“Three-party” model of professional independence, places in-house counsel in a 
privileged position. If the core duty that our self-regulated profession values above all is 
the duty of loyalty to the client, then in-house counsel are better situated to fulfill this 
duty, given the unparalleled knowledge of the business that their position affords and 
because of their entire and undivided devotion to a single client. 
 
One explanation for the lack of clarity around the nature and scope of the duty of 
independence from the client is that it is more controversial,167 and that it is more likely 
to come in conflict with other professional duties that are considered paramount. For 
instance, the professional duty of confidentiality with respect to the client and the very 
limited instances where it can be waived by the lawyer (even when the client has or is 
about to commit criminal or unlawful activities), reinforce the duty of loyalty to the 
client. It is part of the fundamental right of adequate legal representation. It reflects a 
strong belief of our legal system that the client can only be well served with an unfettered 
duty of confidentiality in her favor, and an almost absolute solicitor-client privilege.168 
                                                                                                                                            
 
165
 See Fox, supra note 129, at 553, where the author describes the duty of independence from the client as one of the 
core values of the legal profession. 
 
166
 Smith, supra note 3, at 16 and fol. For instance, she should never assist a client in committing an illegal or a criminal 
act: LSBC Rules, supra, note 21, at Chapter 1, Canons of legal ethics, paragraph 1.(1); CBA Code, supra note 7, at 
Chapter III “Advising Clients”, commentary 7; L.S.A. Code, supra note 7, at Chapter 14, Rule 2. 
167
 Gordon, supra note 42, at 11-12. 
 
168
 Pritchard v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 809, at paragraphs 14, 16-18. For a criticism of 
the confidentiality privilege applying to large organization clients, see D. Luban, Lawyers and Justice (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1988), Chapter 10, “Corporate Counsel and Confidentiality”, 206. 
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Recent attempts to add new exceptions to the CBA Code,169  i.e. “whistle blowing” 
provisions similar to the ones adopted in 2003 by the American Bar Association (the 
“ABA Model Rules”)170 have stirred a heated debate.171 As a result, the CBA Code 
remained substantially unchanged.172 The ABA Model Rules modifications, which raised 
a no less heated debate, now allow counsel to divulge confidential information of their 
client to prevent a crime or fraud or substantial injury to financial interests of another 
person.173 While there is some variance on the scope of the duty of confidentiality, there 
is no similar exception to the duty of confidentiality in Canada.174 In case of fraud, crime 
or other illegal acts, the lawyer’s power of action is limited to going “up the ladder” in 
the corporate organization,175 withdraw from the case and eventually to resign.176 The 
result is that counsel may interpret the scope of their duty of loyalty to the client as overly 
broad and feel constrained and ill equipped to face situations where other paramount 
interests are equally at stake. The arguments put forward against whistle-blowing 
provisions are that they threaten the privileged relation of confidence and candor that in-
house counsel are able to develop by reason of their unique position, by creating a 
perception that they are a “cop” and not an advisor.177 It also diminishes in-house 
counsel’s ability to exercise persuasive influence. Other commentators argue that on the 
contrary, whistle-blowing provisions give in-house counsel more clarity on their legal 
and ethical duties and that they can be used as a lever when it comes to ensuring 
                                               
169
 Supra note 8. 
170
 American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct, (“ABA Model Rules”) available online at the 
American Bar Association website at www.abanet.org  (last visited on February 6, 2011). 
171
 Paton, supra note 13, at 557-558. 
 
172
 CBA Code, supra note 7, at Chapter IV, “Confidentiality” and Commentary 18. 
 
173
 ABA Model Rules, supra note 170, Model Rule 1.6. 
 
174
 Supra note 105. 
 
175
 To reconcile the duty of confidentiality with the obligation not to encourage the perpetration of a fraudulent act, 
crime or unlawful activity, some rules of conduct contain an “up the ladder reporting obligation”:  L.S.U.C. Rules, 
supra note 7, at. 2.02 (5) to (5.2); Québec Code of Ethics, supra note 7, 3.05.18. 
  
176
 L.S.A. Code, supra note 7, at Chapter 14; L.S.B.C. Rules, supra note 20, at Chapter 10. 
 
177
 Veasey and Di Guglielmo, supra note 33, at 24: discuss this phenomenon and how this makes law makers careful in 
making any policy changes that may have a negative impact on the relationship of trust between the corporate counsel 
and the representatives of the client-corporations.  
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compliance with the law.178 It also gives them more courage and power to act 
independently.179 The use of this procedure is likely to remain highly exceptional and  
any abusive recourse to this procedure seem improbable: the inherent pressures and 
complexities of counsel functions point towards more restraint than overuse.  The fear of 
“breaking communication channels’” line of argument is harder to justify to the public 
when what we are trying to prevent is the commission of a criminal act or securities 
fraud. In essence, the whistle-blowing provisions180 come as an aid, as an “exist strategy” 
to counsel, and to the corporation and the public best interest, when counsel’s persuasive 
advice to comply with the law has failed. This resistance to any regulation that 
encroaches on the sacrosanct relationship between counsel and corporate clients, even to 
prevent the commission of criminal acts and fraud, may be another illustration of the 
failure by the legal profession to recognize the desirability and benefits181 of a greater 
distance and independence of counsel from the client. 
 
Codes of Professional Conduct allow much flexibility on the various approaches to 
lawyering.  There is also a rich debate in the scholarly literature on the ideal role of 
counsel.182 In this context, counsel (both in-house and outside counsel) can be torn 
between very different models. They are given little guidance on how to interpret 
conflicts between professional duties as they arise. In some areas of practice, the checks 
and balances assuring a proper order of precedence between the various professional 
duties may not be as prevalent, making the application of the rules in Codes of 
Professional Conduct more ambiguous and problematic.183 Among the various ideal 
                                               
178
 Paton, supra note 13, at 558; Duggin, supra note 5, at 1004: the author points to evidence indicating that business 
managers realize the importance and are more inclined to seek out “candid legal advice” in the aftermath of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley new regulation environment.  
179Paton, supra note 13, at 558; Veasey and Di Guglielmo, supra note 33, at 21. 
180
 Including the mere prospect of using the whistle-blowing mechanism. 
 
181
 I.e. to legal counsel, the legal profession and the public. 
 
182
 Supra note 61. 
 
183
 For instance, a transactional lawyer does not interact with the courts and the judiciary, one instance where the 
interests of clients are more directly confronted to other interests such as preserving the proper administration of 
justice, deference to the courts, interaction with the other party. 
 42 
models of lawyering that are proposed, one is of particular interest to our discussion on 
the need to better articulate the duty of professional from the client. Some commentators 
argue that the role of counsel includes the one of “gatekeeper”,184 particularly so in the 
context of public corporations. Although this position is controversial in the legal 
community, it reflects an interesting attempt to articulate a broader array of interests and 
duties than the duty of ensuring the most successful outcome to the client alone. It signals 
that legal professionalism should also entail maintaining a proper distance from the client.  
 
Any attempt to establish a hierarchy amongst counsel’s professional duties is eminently 
complex because of the inherent conflicts within their various roles. For instance on the 
one hand, in the role of preserving the rule of law, of preserving the independence of their 
profession and of preserving their clients’ interests,185 lawyers have a duty to remain 
critical of the state and unencumbered by it in the fulfillment of their professional 
duties.186  On the other hand, these fundamental goals and duties need to be accomplished 
in support of and compliance with our democratic institutions. While a lawyer may 
criticize a law and actively take part in any legislative process to improve it, she should 
not disobey the law, nor encourage any one to do so.  
 
Establishing a hierarchy between the various professional duties of counsel may be 
impractical or extremely difficult to achieve. However, a poor articulation by the legal 
profession of the duty of professional independence from the client, and of the ideal 
model of lawyering, as well as the lack of concrete mechanisms to give effect to such 
duty, provide little support to in-house counsel (and to a certain extent outside counsel). 
They may face ethical dilemmas in an environment where the strong promotion of 
                                                                                                                                            
 
184
 Kim, supra note 11.  
 
185
 See for example the CBA Code, supra note 7, Chapter IX The Lawyer as Advocate “When acting as an advocate, 
the lawyer must treat the court or tribunal with courtesy and respect and must represent the client resolutely, 
honourably and within the limits of the law.”  
186
 As Harry Arthurs explains, paradoxically, as much as the legal profession proclaims its independence from the 
state and is by essence in opposition with the state, in many ways, it is also “deeply implicated in the state”: H. Arthurs, 
“Lawyering In Canada In The 21st Century” (1996) 15 Windsor Y.B. Access to Just. 202, at 204-207. 
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undivided loyalty to the client,187 amplified by the overall structure of in-house legal 
departments and law firm practices, leave broader duties to the public and to the legal 
profession vague, remote or even unknown. The Enron, Tyco and Worldcom scandals 
show all too well where a lack of distance from the client can lead to, and how the public 
can be let down not only by senior executives, but also by lawyers.  
 
Articulated rules of conduct – in this instance on the duty of professional independence 
from the client- can never completely prevent the commission of a crime or always 
nurture rightful and well guided actions by counsel. But they could give concrete 
ammunition to counsel, particularly to in-house counsel, in reminding their client-
corporation through its representatives, why they hired a professional lawyer in the first 
place. Hugh P. Gunz and Sally P. Gunz point to what should set professionals in general 
apart from other employees: “if professionals are not able to retain sufficient 
independence so as to defend their professional integrity in critical decisions, why, 
ultimately, pay a premium for their skills? What distinguishes them from any other 
manager?”188 A stronger duty of professional independence from the client could also 
protect the client who may be misguided at times about the proper course of action to 
take. From that perspective, it supports the primary duty of counsel to provide legal 
services in a competent and diligent manner. Some form of duty of professional 
independence from the client does and needs to exist in order to reconcile the various 
professional duties of counsel. The void that currently prevails as to its exact nature, and 
with respect to concrete mechanisms to support its application, needs to be filled. While it 
may not eliminate the ethical dilemmas that are inherent to the practice of law -whether 
by in-house or by outside counsel- it may alleviate them significantly.   
 
It is puzzling how bars are unequivocal about the importance of preserving their 
independence from the state, but only timidly articulate, at the individual member level, 
the duty of professional independence from the client. Clearly, the independence of the 
legal profession from the state serves a critical function in support of our democratic 
                                               
187
 As they are reinforced by unfettered duties of confidentiality. 
188
 Gunz and Gunz, supra note 13, at 249-250, citing M. Davis, “Professional Autonomy: A Framework for Empirical 
Research” (1996) 6 Bus. Ethics Q. 441, at 454-455. 
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institutions. But this does not alleviate the responsibility that the legal profession owes 
towards the public. Resisting state encroachment in how the legal profession regulates 
counsel on the basis of independence should not be confused with the substantive issues 
that the state is trying to resolve at any given time, such as the need to protect investors 
adequately. Protecting the public interest beyond ensuring adequate legal representation 
of individual clients, should serve as one important justification and legitimacy of their 
self-regulatory status. As a trade-off of retaining their independence, the bars need to 
weigh in  some of the public interest functions that are normally borne by the state.  As 
Susanna M. Kim points out: “In comparison to all other professions, the legal profession 
is the most free of external governmental control. Given the enormous amount of 
independence that is afforded to lawyers in this context, they have a special responsibility 
to the public and to the system of law to regulate their behavior in the public interest.”189 
In addition to offering support to counsel and to clients, a better articulation of the duty of 
professional independence from the client also serves the public, beyond ensuring the 
quality of the immediate representation needs of each individual client. Without this 
recalibration, the legal profession runs the risk of being perceived as compromising its 
independence for the sake of other powerful interests outside the state, and by the same 
token, of promoting the self-interest of its members too strongly.   
 
By way of preliminary conclusion, given the little emphasis that the legal profession 
currently places on the duty of professional independence from the client, there is no 
justification to regulate in-house counsel differently than outside counsel. The equal 
treatment in the regulation of in-house and outside counsel by the legal profession is 
consistent  with the predominant value that it accords to the fundamental right to 
adequate legal representation and the duty of loyalty to the client . It is also consistent 
with an anemic articulation by the legal profession of the duty of  professional 
independence from the client. And yet, such duty exists. Without it, counsel’s duties to 
the court, the legal profession, the state and the public cannot be fulfilled. Professional 
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independence from the client can also enable counsel to better fulfill their duty to serve 
their client in a competent and diligent manner and preserve their client’s best interests.  
 
IV. Alleviating ethical dilemmas of (in-house) counsel 
 
The discussion in Part II of this paper points to potential areas of concern for in-house 
counsel, and in some cases outside counsel, on the ideal degree of independence that they 
need to maintain from the client, i.e. one that can allow them to reconcile their diverging 
professional duties. Commentators are raising doubt about the real existence on the 
terrain, of professional autonomy from the client for in-house and outside counsel. 190 The 
analysis in Part II of this paper also reveals that in-house counsel are in a privileged 
position to promote important core values of the legal profession and that as such, their 
role in the legal profession should be recognized and encouraged. The lack of articulation 
of a duty of professional independence from the client by the legal profession, and of 
appropriate mechanisms to actualize it, provide little support and guidance to in-house 
counsel and to some extent outside counsel.191 It leaves them and their client in a 
vulnerable position.192  
 
The following remarks and recommendations involve a mix of substantive issues and 
implementation considerations. They give prominence to Codes of Professional Conduct 
as one important tool to encapsulate substantive goals and rules that are further 
strengthened by concrete implementation mechanisms. Although there is doubt about the 
relevance and effectiveness of Codes of Professional Conduct in regulating professional 
conduct or in resolving ethical issues,193 their binding nature on members of the legal 
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 Nelson and Nielson question claims to the existence of professional autonomy from the client by in-
house and outside counsel representing corporate clients, based on a review of legal ethics literature 
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 Kim, supra note 5, at 257. 
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 M. A.Wilkinson, C. Walker & P. Mercer, “Do Codes of Ethics Actually Shape Legal Practice?” (2000) 45 McGill 
L.J. 645 at 653, 655, 678: in a study involving the interview of 180 lawyers in Ontario (of which 30 were in-house 
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the code of conduct in their interviews. See also Nelson and Nielson, supra note 6 at 490, where the author explains that 
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profession, makes them an ideal vehicle to incentivize respect for counsel’s professional 
duties. In that spirit, Codes of Professional Conduct should articulate as clearly as is 
practicably possible, the goals of the legal profession, and how counsel are expected to 
individually fulfill these goals. In addition, rules to ensure that the structural environment 
in which counsel evolve is aligned with their professional duties need to be in place.  
 
The “ideal” approach to lawyering is an essential issue for the understanding of the 
position of in-house counsel in the legal profession. Yet, there is clearly a lack of 
consensus on what that ideal should be.194 Greater clarity and articulation around that 
ideal is a pre-condition to any meaningful regulatory review of in-house counsel and 
other groups within the legal profession.195 This exercise is also only possible with a 
greater introspection into the ideal of the legal profession as a whole and into the 
meaning of its independence. The two are ineluctably intertwined.196 
 
Codes of Professional Conduct generally remind counsel that the client is the corporation 
and not its representatives. Raising the potential conflicts of interests that it may pose and 
providing for a conflict of interest procedure to follow (inspired by client-to-client 
conflict of interest rules) could provide additional guidance and support to counsel. 
However, the difficulty will often reside in identifying the conflict of interest in the first 
place. Acting in the best interest of the client’s corporation may in some cases be open to 
very diverging opinions. Counsel’s trust in or allegiance to the representative of the 
corporation may be so high that counsel will rely on the representative’s view of the 
                                                                                                                                            
the way in –house counsel construct their role is shaped in large part by how business clients and senior executives 
react to the way they provide legal advice. In that sense, it is very much a reciprocal process among counsel, their 
“clients” and senior management. 
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 Wilkinson, Mercer & Strong, supra note 61, at 375-382, reviewed the legal ethics literature on the role of lawyers 
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interest of the corporation or would not even detect the existence of a conflict of interest.  
Articulating the likelihood of such conflicts in Codes of Professional Conduct or related 
instruments can alert counsel and increase their awareness to such ethical issues. Some of 
the structural recommendations made further below can also offer significant support to 
counsel who are confronted to a potential conflict of interest. 
 
Even if the concept of the duty of professional independence from the client is 
controversial, such a duty nevertheless exists. The legal profession needs to engage in a 
dialogue on its scope. When doing so, it should be mindful of the perils of too weak a 
duty of professional independence from the client. Ultimately, such soul searching should 
be aimed at providing stronger support to counsel, with tangible implementation 
mechanisms to facilitate its actualization. A better articulation of the duty of professional 
independence from the client raises fundamental issues that relate to the core values of 
the legal profession. It will need to address the potential conflicts with more established 
and recognized professional duties.  For instance, the duty of professional independence 
is potentially in conflict with the fundamental right of adequate legal representation, the 
general duty of loyalty of counsel and the near-absolute nature of the solicitor-client 
privilege.197 For that reason, “whistle blowing” or similar provisions are viewed as a 
threat to these sacrosanct rights and duties and often encounter fierce resistance in the 
legal profession. At the same time, such provisions are concrete tools for counsel to take 
a distance from the client to serve other paramount  public interests. There is doubt about 
their efficacy, in part because there may be a natural inhibition to have recourse to such 
mechanisms. This can be explained by the fear of negative retaliation or by the fear of 
taking responsibility for the drastic consequences that whistle-blowing mechanisms can 
lead to. At the same time, their mere existence and the conduct that they seek to clarify 
and promote can, in and of themselves provide important support to counsel facing 
seemingly conflicting ethical obligations.  
 
A clearer articulation of the duty of professional independence from the client should not 
necessarily lead to a radically different treatment of in-house counsel, as it is presently 
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the case in some European countries judging the practice of law to be incompatible with 
being a salaried employee of the client.  The authority that emanates from a membership 
to an independent bar would be lost, and with it the ability to effectively provide legal 
representation with an important preventive and compliance component. The clearer 
articulation of the duty of professional independence from the client should aim at 
invigorating the position of in-house counsel (and other counsel) rather than weaken it. 
In-house counsel have the privileged ability to promote several core values of the legal 
profession. This ability needs to be better recognized and supported. The complexity and 
role fluidity that may initially draw lawyers to practice law in-house may become less 
appealing to them after a closer look,198 even more so in light of recent corporate scandals 
involving in-house counsel.199  Safeguards that are specific to in-house counsel, such as 
special agreements on conditions of employment imposed by some bars, should be 
considered if they help achieve this goal. 200  
 
Based on the reflection and articulation of the duty of professional independence from the 
client, Codes of Professional Conduct ought to generally better articulate the ideal role of 
counsel. For instance, this could be achieved by offering a clearer delineation of the 
duties owed to the administration of justice, the legal profession and the public, beyond 
the duty of loyalty and confidentiality201 owed to the client (including through its 
representatives). In that vein, the zones of tension where this ideal role can be 
compromised (for example, through conflicting ideals with client expectations, or when 
counsel cumulate various legal and non legal functions) need to be better identified. In-
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lawyer becomes aware that an illegal act is about to be committed.  
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house and outside counsel need to be provided with the necessary tools to realize this 
ideal.202  A duty reminding counsel that reporting structures,203 performance evaluation 
and monetary incentives204 (whether for in-house or outside counsel) should be aligned 
with those ideals and the corresponding duties, can play a significant role in ensuring 
better compliance with counsel’s professional duties.205 Targeting specific methods of 
remuneration that can have a detrimental effect on compliance with professional duties 
should be considered. Codes of Professional Conduct could generally raise concern for 
any mode of remuneration that may come in conflict with serving the best interests of the 
client while retaining independent professional judgment. Specific proposals have been 
put forward to redress such misalignments. One of them is that board of directors of 
publicly traded companies should be directly involved in the selection and evaluation of 
general counsel.206 Another suggestion is that performance objectives should incite 
ethical behavior and the exercise of independent professional judgment, and that in-house 
counsel should be rewarded for this.207 In that vein, the practice of stock options and 
departmental bonuses has been raised as posing potential ethical issues around the duty of 
professional independence.208 Generally, rules requiring that the performance evaluation 
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and remuneration methods of counsel (both in-house and outside) need to be aligned with 
their professional conduct obligations, would be a first step to address the potential 
impact of remuneration on ethical behaviors. Their proper implementation by law firms 
and in-house legal departments would provide greater support to in-house and outside 
counsel, alleviating the likely occurrences of ethical dilemmas caused by compensation 
and performance incentives.209  
 
There should be a specific requirement in Canadian professional bars to pursue 
continuing education in legal ethics.210 Imposing it as a requirement (and monitoring the 
same through annual filings and disclosures) could be an important way to keep counsel 
(and in particular in-house counsel) appraised of legal ethics issues and recent 
developments. Continuing education on legal ethics as a requirement to maintain 
membership to the bar would exemplify an even stronger commitment to compliance by 
the legal profession. It would stimulate an ongoing conversation between members of the 
legal profession and the public that may lead to a more refined understanding of the 
ethical issues confronting counsel. In turn this could lead to more adapted responses and 
solutions by the legal profession. The various professional associations also need to give 
more visibility and provide better support to their members in the area of legal ethics.211 
The need to appoint ethics officers in larger in-house legal department and law firms, 
with reporting duties on their activities would be another way to promote a greater 
awareness of legal ethics and raise its profile. 
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V. Conclusion 
 
The analysis of in-house counsel within the legal profession shows the complexity of the 
task that any regulation on the role of counsel entails. It is incumbent upon the 
justifications that withstand the independence of the legal profession and the role that it is 
called to play, for which, beyond certain fundamental principles, there is no clear 
consensus.  At a more immediate and concrete level, it shows the difficult balancing act 
with which counsel, the legal profession and the bars are confronted with.Providing more 
guidance and tools at the regulatory level to alleviate the undue burden of conflicting 
allegiances is essential if the legal profession is to support and even promote the practice 
of law by in-house counsel. To this end, a better understanding of how clients generally 
seek out counsel for legal advice and apply it, as well as of the scope and limits of 
counsel’s actual influence on their client, is also critical.212 In the end, the 
recommendations for reform made in this paper would not only benefit in-house counsel, 
but also outside counsel, their clients, the legal profession and the public.213  
 
Urging the legal profession self-regulating bodies to better articulate the meaning and 
foundation of their independence, and to also provide more clarity on the degree of 
independence from the client may lead to further research and debate on other areas of 
counsel’s role that have not been explored in this paper. For instance, how the duty of 
professional independence from the client should be articulated when counsel contribute 
to scientific publications and participate in professional education panels and debates? 
The discussion of this paper may also be of relevance to other debates within the legal 
profession, such as the issues that revolve around multidisciplinary practice. Proposals 
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for further developments and transformation of the legal profession in that direction are 
likely to resurface in one form or the other in a not so distant future.  
